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Abstract 
 
Microfinance markets in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have experienced remarkable growth, 
particularly after the early 2000s.  Since microfinance institutions (MFIs) provide financial 
services such as loans, savings and insurance to poor clients who face exclusion from formal 
financial institutions, they are considered as one of the most prolific tools to alleviate poverty 
and achieve financial inclusion in developing countries.  These institutions are of particular 
importance in SSA, given that the region has the highest poverty levels in the world and the 
highest levels of financial exclusion.   However, in recent years the fast loan growth of MFIs 
has been accompanied increasingly by loan delinquencies which threaten the financial health 
of these institutions. This is a major concern for policymakers, regulators and practitioners 
given the developmental importance of microfinance in the region. Despite the pivotal role of 
microfinance, there is only a very limited number of studies that either investigate the 
underlying reasons for the fast growth of MFIs or that identify the determinants of credit risk 
in MFIs in this particular region of Africa.  
Motivated by both the remarkable loan growth and the rising credit risk that MFIs experienced 
and the fact that SSA has been neglected in the relevant literature, this thesis provides evidence 
from the region on the factors that contribute to MFIs’ growth, the determinants of MFIs’ credit 
risk as well as the factors that influence access to MFIs credit.  The latter pays particular 
attention to the effect of mobile financial services (MFS) on borrowing from MFIs, an aspect 
that has been ignored in previous scholarly work.  Furthermore, the thesis overcomes the 
limitations of previous studies that employed static regressions, which are limited in dealing 
with panel endogeneity bias, by focusing on the dynamic aspects of loan growth and credit risk.  
The thesis is structured around three related studies that are presented in three chapters, namely 
Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The purpose of the second chapter is to identify the factors 
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that explain variations in loan growth in the region’s MFIs. This is an important issue as high 
loan growth may pose significant stability risks in the microfinance sector via a deterioration 
in portfolio quality. The chapter applies two-step system generalised method of moments 
estimators on data for 34 countries in SSA over the period 2004 - 2014. The results show that 
loan growth is higher in MFIs that have lower risk exposure, higher capital asset ratios and 
already recording high growth. Similarly, loan growth is higher in countries with better 
economic prospects, and in those with sound private sector policies and regulations. Against 
expectations, loan growth is faster in countries with poor legal rights of borrowers and lenders.  
 
Credit risk in microfinance institutions in SSA has been rising, and the financial health of these 
institutions remains an issue of concern. Hence, Chapter 3 examines the factors that explain 
variations in credit risk in MFIs in the region. Similarly, the chapter employs a system GMM 
approach on data for 34 countries in SSA over the period 2004 – 2014. Results suggest that the 
main predictors of credit risk in SSA are lagged credit risk, loan growth, provisions for loan 
impairment, GDP per capita growth and ease of getting credit. In addition, the study identifies 
threshold effects in the relationship between credit risk and loan growth. Credit risk falls with 
loan growth until a trough at 36.8% when this relationship is reversed. On the regional scale, 
comparisons suggest that credit risk is most persistent in East Asia and the Pacific but least 
persistent in SSA.  
Relatively few scholarly works have analysed the influence of mobile financial services (MFS) 
on access to credit. Chapter 4 aims to identify the factors that explain the differences in the 
propensity to use loans from MFIs in Kenya, paying particular attention to the effects of mobile 
money (M-money), mobile banking (M-banking) and mobile credit (M-credit).  Kenya is an 
interesting case study because the country outperforms other SSA countries in terms of 
financial and digital inclusion. The study applies a probit model using FinAccess cross 
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sectional data that was collected in 2013 (N=6112) and 2015 (N=8665). After addressing 
endogeneity concerns in the data, the 2013 results suggest that the factors that make a 
significant difference in the likelihood of using MFI credit include income, gender and type of 
cluster. An important observation is that non-poor users of M-money are more likely to use 
microcredit. The 2015 results show that the likelihood of using MFI credit is lower among 
those using M-banking and M-credit as well as among males and married persons. However, 
higher income, being educated, higher household size and being located in a rural cluster are 
associated with a higher propensity to use MFI credit. In addition, the results suggest a U-
shaped relationship between age and the probability to use MFI credit. Similarly, the negative 
relationship between the likelihood of using MFI credit and using M-banking and M-credit 
suggests that the introduction of MFS in the financial sector has resulted in the migration of 
clients from microfinance products towards mobile-based financial services.     
In terms of policy, two recommendations stand out. Firstly, since dynamics matter for both 
loan growth and credit risk, credit management strategies that incorporate past risk and loan 
performance are likely to be more effective. Secondly, the evident trade-offs between loan 
growth and credit risk confirm the fact that modest loan growth is not the source of instability 
within the region’s microfinance sector. However, the presence of threshold effects suggests 
that MFIs should determine the turning points for lending growth because excessive growth in 
loans can be perilous to the existence of the institution itself, and the sector by extension. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Broadly, the concept of microfinance encompasses the provision of credit plus the 
accumulation of savings and other financial services, including the supply of insurance 
policies, in lesser amounts to cater for poor clients, who are conventionally believed to lack the 
capacity to access the formal financial institutions (Dichter, 2007; Onyuma and Shem, 2005). 
Since microfinance targets the “bottom of the pyramid”, it has been viewed as one of the most 
prolific tools for alleviating poverty and achieving financial inclusion in developing countries 
(Triki and Faye, 2013). This is because microfinance offers not only financial services but also 
add-ons that develop sectors such as education, nutrition, health and also build entrepreneurial 
skills. 
 
Microfinance markets in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have witnessed remarkable growth, 
particularly after the 2000s. Their gross loan portfolio grew by about 23 times between 2000 
and 2014, which represents an annual median growth rate of 25% per annum (see Appendix 
Table A1). During the same period, the number of active borrowers expanded by about 5 times 
representing an annual median growth rate of 18%. Assets of the sector have mushroomed by 
a factor of 27 while the number of depositors grew from 773,000 in 2000 to 14.8 million in 
2014, representing an annual median growth of 22.7%.  
Between 2000 and 2007, median annual growth in gross loan portfolio and assets in SSA was 
36.8% and 38.2%, respectively. Over this period, the number of borrowers and depositors grew 
annually by 24% and 25.2% respectively. Although these growth patterns slowed down in the 
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2008-2014 period, partly due to the adverse effects of the global financial crisis (Wagner and 
Winkler, 2013), there have been concerns among development practitioners and regulators 
(Shankar and Asher, 2010) regarding this rapid expansion in microfinance markets. Sceptics 
wonder whether this rapid growth is truly beneficial (Wichterich, 2012) and whether this 
growth is too fast (Gonzalez, 2010). Moreover, there are fears that such growth may not be 
sustainable in the medium term and may pose significant risks to the stability of the financial 
sector via a deterioration in portfolio quality (or an increase in non-performing loans). This last 
concern is consistent with real business cycle theory which associates episodes of credit booms 
with overheating of financial markets, which eventually end up as financial crises (Elekdag 
and Wu, 2011).  
Fears that fast loan growth in microfinance markets could be harmful to the stability of the 
sector have arisen from episodes of increasing loan default rates. Credit risk is usually reflected 
as an increase in non-performing loans and indicates the increasing vulnerability of a financial 
institution (Craig and Dan, 2013). In 2000, credit risk was 3.5% in SSA microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), which increased to 8.2% in 2010 and 8.1% in 2014 (see Appendix Figure 
A2 Panel A). Similarly, there have been episodes of ailing and dying MFIs in India, Morroco, 
Pakistan, Nicaragua, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chen et al., 2010; Wichterich, 2012). In SSA, 
there have been insolvencies in Ghana (50 MFIs in 2013 alone), the West African Economic 
Monetary Union (25 MFIs), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (4 
MFIs) and one each recorded in Zambia and South Africa (Boateng et al., 2016; Riquet and 
Poursat, 2013). This instability in the microfinance sector has been attributed to the failure of 
MFIs to prioritize risk management and to other factors such as weak regulation, excessive 
market growth, predatory lending, fraud and loss of focus (Lutzenkirchen et al., 2012; 
Marulanda et al., 2010). Despite these episodes, there has been little empirical analysis to 
unravel the relationship between loan growth and portfolio at risk in SSA microfinance 
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markets. Furthermore, little is known on how such growth, especially when it is excessive, 
impacts asset quality in microfinance. The aim of this thesis is to provide new evidence on the 
trade-offs between loan growth and credit risk in MFIs located in SSA and to analyse the causes 
of loan growth and the associated risk. It also explores demand-side factors that could be used 
to explain the expansion witnessed in the region’s microfinance markets. 
At the global level, scholarly works have attempted to explain variations in loan growth in 
microfinance markets (Wagner and Winkler, 2013; Ahlin et al., 2011). Whereas Wagner and 
Winkler (2013) sought to explain whether microfinance was exposed to global financial crises, 
Ahlin et al. (2011) were more concerned with the effect of macroeconomic and institutional 
factors on the microfinance sector.  Regarding credit risk exposure, empirics have been 
concerned with the roles of gender (Schmit and Marrez, 2010; D’espallier et al., 2011), group 
lending (Crabb and Keller, 2006), macroeconomic shocks (Gonzalez, 2007), loan growth 
(Gonzalez, 2010) and loan size (Chikalipah, 2018). In addition, Sainz-Fernandez et al. (2015), 
Yimga (2016), Lassoued (2017) and Noomen and Abbes (2018) sought to identify the drivers 
of credit risk. From the demand side, studies that have sought to explain why access to finance 
differs across households and countries include Mohieldin and Wright (2000), Okurut (2006), 
Manrique and Ojah (2004), Zeller (1994), Okurut et al. (2005), Khoi et al. (2013) and Farazi 
(2014). Generally, these studies have identified individual factors, household characteristics, 
financial factors, sector-level attributes and macro-institutional factors as the key determinants 
of access to credit.   
 
A review of the relevant literature reveals glaring gaps in studies that analyse the determinants 
of both loan growth and risk in microfinance markets first of which is that SSA has been 
neglected in the relevant literature. Secondly, previous studies have paid little attention to the 
dynamic aspects of loan growth and risk. They employed static regressions, applying either 
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random effects and fixed effects estimators which are limited in dealing with panel endogeneity 
bias. They also failed to deal with endogeneity issues that arise from omitted variables, 
measurement errors and reverse causality. The third gap observed is that very few studies have 
explored these issues at the disaggregated level, yet such analysis unmasks important 
differences in the effects of region-specific idiosyncratic factors. Undertaking international 
comparisons is useful because it allows one to test whether factors that turn out statistically 
significant in SSA are also important elsewhere. Finally, relatively few scholarly works have 
analysed the effect of mobile financial services (MFS) on access to credit. Given these 
knowledge gaps, this thesis approaches microfinance from both the demand and supply sides. 
From the supply side, the thesis considers the lending behaviour in MFIs and examines whether 
excessive lending is associated with higher risk exposure and whether any non-linearities exist 
in this relationship. The demand side looks at some of the potential barriers to accessing MFI 
credit at the household level.  
 
Specifically, the aim of Chapters 2 and 3 is to identify the factors that determine loan growth 
and assess predictors of credit risk differences in SSA, respectively. Both chapters also 
compare and contrast the statistical significance of these factors in other global regions. 
Chapters 2 and 3 apply system generalised method of moments (GMM) on data from 2004-
2014 to investigate the determinants of loan growth and credit risk in SSA microfinance 
markets while also identifying any trade-offs that may exist between both variables. Data was 
derived from four sources: MIX dataset, World Development Indicators, World Governance 
Indicators and Doing Business Indicators. These two chapters contribute to the literature in 
several ways. Firstly, they provide evidence on SSA, which is a region that has been neglected 
in the literature. Secondly, they extend the models that have been used previously by 
introducing dynamics as well as specific and idiosyncratic factors of the SSA region. Thirdly, 
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they use system GMM estimators, which have been known to accommodate endogeneity 
biases. Lastly, they identify predictors of loan growth and risk in Eastern Asia and the Pacific 
(EAP), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and 
South Asia (SA).  
 
Both Chapters establish the existence of trade-offs between loan growth and risk. Loan growth 
was higher in MFIs facing lower risk exposure and vice versa. In contrast to Chapter 2, the 
third Chapter establishes non-linearities between loan growth and credit risk, thus providing 
evidence of threshold effects. The two Chapters also report that dynamics are important in 
predicting both loan growth and credit risk, which points to the persistence of these two 
variables. In addition, the analysis in Chapter 2 shows that loan growth in MFIs for the entire 
period (2004-2014) is higher when ease of getting credit is lower and when capitalisation, GDP 
growth and regulatory quality are higher. According to Chapter 3, other predictors of credit 
risk in SSA MFIs are provisions for loan impairment, GDP per capita growth and ease of 
getting credit. A comparative analysis of credit risk determinants in Chapter 3 shows that credit 
risk was persistent in all regions (ECA, EECA, LAC and SA). The same analysis in Chapter 2 
identifies loan growth as an important predictor of credit risk in all regions. A global analysis 
of loan growth determinants in Chapter 2 also shows that loan growth is persistent in all 
regions. 
Chapter 4 examines the differences in the propensity to use microcredit in Kenya using 
FinAccess survey data collected in 2013 and 2015, paying particular attention to the effects of 
MFS including M-banking, M-money and M-credit on the likelihood of using microcredit. 
Kenya is an interesting case study because the country out-performs other countries in the 
region in terms of both financial and digital inclusion. The 2014 Global Financial Inclusion 
database shows that out of 38 SSA countries, account ownership in Kenya was 74.7% 
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compared to 34.2% for SSA while mobile money account penetration in Kenya was 58.4% 
against 11.5% for SSA. A 2016 report by the Brookings Institution comparing 26 countries in 
terms of M-money adoption ranked Kenya on top of the sample countries1. The high rating of 
the country has been attributed to the financial innovation of M-PESA2, which has drastically 
altered the way people save, borrow and transact. Significantly lowering many barriers that 
discourage poor people from accessing banking services, M-PESA has also had an impact on 
access to microcredit following its explosion in the last few years. After addressing 
endogeneity concerns via instrumental variables (IV 2SLS and IV Probit), the results in 
Chapter 4 show that the probability of using MFI credit is lower among those using M-banking 
and M-credit as well as among males and married persons. However, higher income, education 
level, household size and being located in a rural cluster is associated with a higher probability 
to use MFI credit. Furthermore, the analysis shows evidence of a U-shaped relationship 
between the probability of using MFI credit and age.  
 
The findings in this thesis have important policy implications for both practitioners and 
regulators of microfinance in SSA. The finding that loan growth and credit risk are negatively 
correlated implies that modest loan growth is not a source of instability in the MFI sector. 
Rather, excessive loan growth is potentially harmful to the instability of MFIs.  Therefore, these 
institutions should be encouraged to identify the threshold at which loan growth becomes 
harmful to their stability. Another pivotal finding is that dynamics predict lending growth and 
credit risk. This implies that lending methodologies, such as credit scoring and credit 
modelling, that incorporate past lending and loan defaults are likely to be more effective. 
                                                          
1 Refer to Villasenor et al. (2016) 
2 Introduced into the Kenyan market in 2007 by Safaricom, M-PESA consists of two words. “M” stands for 
“mobile” and “PESA” is a Kiswahili word that means “Money”. Put together, “M-PESA” means “Mobile Money” 
which is a mobile phone platform that allows users to exchange cash for an “e-float” on their phones, to send e-
float to other cellular phone users and to exchange e-float back to cash (Mbiti and Weil, 2011). 
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Regarding the negative correlation between the use of microcredit, on one hand, and the use of 
M-banking and M-credit, on the other hand, the results imply that the introduction of MFS has 
heightened competition in the traditional microfinance sector. Hence, MFS should be designed 
in ways that do not harm access to microcredit.    
1.2 Why Focus on Sub-Saharan Africa? 
 
There are two main reasons why this thesis is centred on this particular region of Africa. Firstly, 
SSA has the highest poverty levels in the world and the highest levels of financial exclusion 
(Begle et al., 2016; World Development Indicators, 2017). Secondly, indicators of performance 
show a significant difference between SSA and non-SSA MFIs (See Appendix Table A2). At 
the global level, SSA has both high poverty and low financial deepening. About 43% of the 
population in SSA lives on less than USD 1.90 a day compared to 11% in developing countries 
(Begle et al., 2016). Between 2004 and 2014, the share of domestic credit to the private sector 
by banks in GDP was 17% for SSA and 34% for developing countries3. These statistics suggest 
a bigger role for microfinance to promote financial inclusion and poverty reduction in SSA 
than elsewhere.   In spite of this evidence, SSA remains the least researched area in terms of 
microfinance; studies seeking to understand the implications of the fast growth in microfinance 
markets and the associated risks are few. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis focuses on SSA because the indicators in Appendix Table A2 provide 
several reasons to believe that there is a significant difference in the performance of MFIs in 
SSA as compared to their counterparts in other developing regions. Using several MFI 
performance indicators, the t-test for equality of means confirms this conjecture. These 
                                                          
3 Author’s computation using World Development Indicators 
(https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-7386-6) 
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indicators include institutional characteristics, outreach, sustainability, revenue mobilization, 
spending levels, efficiency, productivity and risk exposure. On the basis of outreach, SSA lags 
behind in terms of number of active borrowers, gross loan portfolio and the share of women in 
the total number of active borrowers. There is a difference in gross loan portfolio of USD 12.4 
million between an average MFI in SSA and an MFI elsewhere. This difference is significant 
at 1%. In terms of overall financial performance, MFIs in SSA are generally less operationally 
self-sustainable than MFIs elsewhere. Two indicators on revenues, namely financial revenue 
ratio and yield on gross portfolio, confirm that average loan interest rates charged by MFIs are 
relatively higher in SSA MFIs compared to rates charged on loans in other developing regions. 
The analysis also shows that MFIs in SSA are relatively inefficient and less productive on the 
basis of the following ratios: operating expense ratio, personnel expense ratio, borrowers per 
staff member and depositors per staff member. A comparison between the two groups in terms 
of loan write-offs and non-earning liquid assets as percentage of total assets shows that MFIs 
in SSA are not only more liquid but they are also riskier compared to their counterparts in other 
regions.   
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is presented as follows. Chapter 2 identifies the factors that explain 
variations in loan growth in SSA MFIs while Chapter 3 examines their exposure to credit risk.  
The next chapter explores the impact of mobile-based financial services on microfinance and 
explains why access to MFI credit differs among households in Kenya. Concluding the thesis, 
Chapter 5 provides some policy recommendations, limitations and suggestions for further 
research in the microcredit sector.  
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Chapter 2 
Determinants of Loan Growth in Microfinance Institutions: The Case of 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Comparisons with other Regions of the World 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Between 2000 and 2014, lending in microfinance markets in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) rose 
sharply. The number of borrowers increased from 854,692 in 2000 to about 4.3 million in 2014. 
Gross loan portfolio, which stood at US$250 million in 2000 rose to about US$5.9 billion in 
2014. The stock of microfinance assets rose from US$360 million in 2000 to US$9.9 billion in 
2014. Between 2000 and 2008, credit expanded at about 36.8% annually and the cross-MFI 
variability in the loan growth was also high (Appendix Figure A1). However, there was a 
decline in both the loan growth rate and variability during the 2009-2014 period implying that 
outreach gains that were experienced before 2009 were beginning to level out. High variability 
during the 2004-2008 period meant that the sharp rise in lending was far from uniform across 
MFIs.  
 
Mean loan growth in SSA was 28% between 2004 and 2014 (Appendix Table A4). In financial 
markets, this is considered rather high. But the percentage masks huge cross-country and cross-
MFI disparities. For individual countries, loan growth ranged from 87.3% in Guinea-Bissau to 
11.1% in Central African Republic and Niger, although some countries such as Comoros and 
Zimbabwe witnessed negative loan growth rates. At the MFI level4, the fastest loan growth 
rates of 530% and 440% were recorded by Reliance (located in Gambia) and Abidjan Credit 
                                                          
4 This data is not reflected in Appendix Table A4 but is available from the author upon request. 
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(located in Ivory Coast), respectively. The lowest loan growth rates of -440% and -390% were 
recorded by CANARI (located in Ivory Coast) and Faching (located in Zimbabwe), 
respectively.  
 
From a policy perspective, sceptics are wondering whether this growth in microcredit markets 
is too fast (Gonzalez, 2010). In fact, it has been feared that such loan growth rates may pose 
significant stability risks in the MFI sector via a deterioration in portfolio quality (Yimga, 2016; 
Chen et al., 2010; Lutzenkirchen and Weistroffer, 2012). These concerns are consistent with 
real business cycle theory which associates credit booms with growing financial crises 
(Elekdag and Wu, 2011). In fact, evidence indicates that many bank crises were preceded by 
rapid credit growth including the recent global recession of 2007-2009 (Amri et al., 2012). 
Therefore, policies to promote the growth of MFIs in SSA need to be based on a good 
understanding of the drivers of loan growth. 
 
Whereas the above disparities and concerns have been evident for some time, extant evidence 
at the global level on what explains the variations in the loan growth rate in microfinance 
markets is now emerging, though knowledge is still limited and inconclusive. For example, 
studies have begun to question whether microfinance (which was initially cushioned from 
systemic shocks) has become vulnerable to such shocks as is the case in the banking sector 
(Wagner and Winkler, 2013). Evidence seems to be in the affirmative. There is also focus on 
whether the macro-institutional environment affects the performance of MFIs (Ahlin et al., 
2011)5. Again, evidence seems to be in the affirmative. But these studies have paid little 
attention to dynamic aspects of loan growth and therefore use static regressions applying either 
                                                          
5 The main question was whether the macro-institutional environment influences the success of microfinance 
using various measures including operational self-sustainability, interest mark-up, loan loss expense rate, risk, 
cost per dollar loaned, cost per borrower, MFI growth, loan growth, loan size growth and borrower growth. 
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random effects and fixed effects estimators which are limited in dealing with panel endogeneity 
bias. They fail to address endogeneity issues that arise from omitted variables, measurement 
errors and reverse causality. Although mean tests confirm that MFIs in SSA are different from 
their counterparts elsewhere, there is not yet evidence on factors that determine loan growth in 
SSA6. In addition, very few studies have explored the issue at the disaggregate level yet such 
an analysis unmasks important differences in the effects of regional-specific idiosyncratic 
factors. Undertaking international comparisons is useful because it allows one to test whether 
factors that turn out statistically significant in SSA are also important elsewhere. Given these 
knowledge gaps, this paper aims to identify the factors that determine loan growth differences 
in SSA and distinguish the various ways such factors affect loan growth in other geographical 
regions.  
 
This chapter contributes to microfinance literature in two ways. Firstly, it extends knowledge 
in this area by providing evidence from SSA, a region that has been neglected in the relevant 
literature despite the important role that MFIs role in the region. Secondly, it expands the 
models that have been employed in the past by considering the dynamic aspects of 
microfinance as well as the specific and idiosyncratic factors of the SSA region. The chapter 
applies panel generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators, which are versatile in dealing 
with endogeneity biases that are pervasive in socio-economic data. 
 
Empirical findings reveal that micro-level, macroeconomic and institutional factors are 
significant predictors of loan growth in SSA. Four main findings stand out. First: loan growth 
is faster among MFIs that were already having high loan growth, which reflects persistence in 
                                                          
6 Mean tests in Table 1 also reveal that the macro-institutional environment in SSA is significantly different 
from the levels existing in non-SSA countries.  
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loan growth. Second: loan growth is higher in MFIs facing lower risk exposure, that are well 
capitalised and those that are located in countries with high GDP growth rates and sound private 
sector policies and regulations. The third notable finding, contrary to expectations, is that loan 
growth is faster in countries with poor legal rights of borrowers and lenders. Finally, variables 
that are statistically significant in the SSA regressions do not necessarily remain significant in 
the regressions for the other regions (Eastern Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia).  
 
The next section of this chapter reviews the relevant literature and identifies some knowledge 
gaps. Section 2.3 presents the empirical model and discusses the data while Section 2.4 reports 
the results. Section 2.5 concludes the discussion and draws some policy implications. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Literature 
 
The economic theory suggests that the amount of credit extended by a financial institution is 
mainly determined by the business cycle (Bernanke et al., 1994), information (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981), institutions (North, 1990) and monetary policy stance (Mishkin, 2013). The 
business cycle view is based on the interconnectedness of credit markets and the 
macroeconomy (Plosser, 1989). In these markets, optimizing decisions of lenders and 
borrowers interact to generate economy-wide cyclical patterns. An offshoot of this reasoning 
is the financial accelerator theory, which was pioneered by Bernanke et al. (1994). This theory 
explains how small adverse changes to the net worth of firms are amplified to propagate huge 
adverse financial and macroeconomic shocks, which in turn set in motion credit cycles. When 
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the net worth of firms falls in the presence of financial frictions, agency costs of lending to 
such firms rise (Mishkin, 2013). Lenders become suspicious of such firms and are less willing 
to grant them credit because a decline in the firms’ net worth gives them a higher incentive to 
invest in risky investment projects arising from the fact that they stand to lose less if the project 
fails. The firms respond by downscaling their investment plans which lowers economic 
activity. This has adverse knock-on effects on asset prices and the net worth of firms, 
perpetuating recurring cycles and feedback loops.  
Business cycle theory predicts procyclicality between loan growth and economic upswings 
(Clair, 1992; Keeton, 1999; Quagliariello, 2007). In addition, it predicts countercyclicality 
between credit risk and economic upswings. When lending is excessive during an economic 
upswing, it ends up as a “credit crunch” during subsequent downturns (Berger and Udell, 
2004). An economic boom is associated with higher profits, higher asset values and optimistic 
customer expectations (Quagliariello, 2007). Because aggregate demand will also be higher 
during an economic boom, demand for loans goes up because the loan servicing capacity of 
borrowers is enhanced. Banks take in more risk by giving new loans at lower interest rates and 
relaxed credit standards resulting in higher indebtedness among borrowers. There is a reversal 
of events during an economic downturn because loan performance problems appear – loan 
defaults will rise and growth in loans will be low.  As such, phases of high loan losses tend to 
be preceded by phases of high loan growth. Similarly, macroeconomic variables may follow 
either a pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical pattern in the presence of economic upwings. For 
example, aggregate demand and inflation tend to be procyclical while unemployment and 
interest rates tend to be counter-cyclical.  
Credit cycles are usually characterised by accelerated lending during business cycle 
expansions, with sharp reversals in lending during subsequent downturns. Keeton (1999) 
argues that the reversals do not always hold. Faster loan growth may not be followed with 
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higher loan losses if there exist either demand or productivity shifts. An increased demand for 
credit unrelated to borrower’s underlying creditworthiness will tend to boost loan growth and 
raise credit standards, reducing the likelihood of future loan losses. A productivity shock that 
could result from improved technology or lower oil prices has the effect of increasing the 
chances that a borrower of given characteristics can repay the loan, allowing banks to relax 
their collateral requirements or accept borrowers with poorer credit histories.  
The second view identifies information as a key determinant of the lending decision because 
the parties contracting are imperfectly informed about each other (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Before making the decision to lend, the creditor needs information about the borrower’s risk 
attitude, goals and credit history; the viability of borrowers’ projects as well as the borrower’s 
other lenders (Djakov et al., 2007). When these are not satisfied, the creditor remains exposed 
to agency costs arising from adverse selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
With the prospect of uncertainty and the likelihood of loan default, the lender tends to incur 
extra costs to monitor the loans, screen the loan applicants and obtain sufficient collateral as 
an incentive to repay the loan. The higher the agency costs, the higher the probability of loan 
default, which reduces the willingness of the lender to extend new loans and renew old loans. 
Information asymmetry problem is usually more acute among SMEs who are the main clients 
to MFIs. These enterprises (SMEs) tend to be informationally opaque – they do not have a 
culture of maintaining up-to-date records and developing business plans (De la Torre et al., 
2010). 
 
The third determinant of lending by MFIs has been termed “the power of creditors” (Djakov et 
al., 2007). It is based on the idea that creditors are more willing to lend if they can easily enforce 
the loan contract. Contract enforcement guarantees property rights, lowers transaction costs 
and reduces opportunistic behaviour in lending (McMullen et al., 2008; North, 1990). A case 
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in point is the finding that the prevalence of corruption resulted in taxing the operations of 
micro-enterprises, consequently constraining their expansion, reducing their demand for loans 
as well as the quality of microloans (Ahlin et al., 2011). Good institutions may also constrain 
lending by financial institutions. When a large proportion of the MFI loan portfolio is held by 
informal sector operators, a shrinking informal sector (caused by strengthening institutions) 
will imply lower loan demand. Udry (1990) finds that MFI loans by informal sector players are 
used for risk pooling. Therefore, the expectation is a negative relationship between stronger 
institutions and growth in lending.  
 
The last view is the government’s monetary policy stance. As explained by Mishkin (2013) and 
Hofmann (2004), there are several channels through which monetary policy is transmitted. 
Only four channels are highlighted here: traditional interest rate, bank lending, balance sheet 
and cash flow. According to the traditional Keynesian view, a contractionary monetary policy 
is associated with higher interest rate, which increases the cost of credit and lowers supply of 
loans. In the bank lending channel, the quantity of bank loans will fall in response to a 
contractionary monetary policy which lowers bank reserves and bank deposits. The balance 
sheet channel works via a fall in adverse selection and moral hazard which accompany a fall 
in the net worth of firms as a result of falling stock prices. Stock prices fall in response to a 
contractionary monetary policy. The cash flow channel also works through firm’s balance 
sheet. Contractionary monetary policy has the effect of lowering firms’ cash flow, which 
worsens the firms’ balance sheet. When the balance worsens, the liquidity of the firm falls – 
curtailing its capacity to pay bills. When the firm’s creditworthiness deteriorates, the lemons 
problem sets in resulting in a lower supply of loans. 
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2.2.2 Empirical Literature 
The empirical literature on the determinants of credit growth in microfinance is scarce. During 
the financial crises of the 1980’s and 1990s7, microfinance exhibited two interesting features 
that later became the focus of research. The first one was the observation that MFIs emerged 
unscathed after the crises, even though the banking sector faced a lot of distress (Wagner and 
Winkler, 2013). It was puzzling that despite the fact that financial crises affected the banking 
sector (crisis prone), microfinance remained unaffected and “crisis free’. The second is the fact 
that accumulation of non-performing assets in MFIs did not result in loan write-offs because 
non-performing assets were always settled (Gonzales, 2010). These two features were 
attributed to high levels of discipline in lending, more productive use of loans by MSEs and 
insulation of MFIs from the global financial system (Wagner and Winkler, 2013).  
The question of whether microfinance was significantly correlated to developments in 
international financial markets remained empirically untested until the study by Krauss and 
Walter (2009). The study used 1998-2006 cross country data to conclude that MFI growth and 
global market indicators were independent. This finding can be contrasted against Wagner and 
Winkler (2013) who found a significant and negative relationship between MFI real credit 
growth and the global financial crisis - the results being sustained even when the data is 
analysed by legal status of the MFI (except credit unions where the effect was insignificant) 
and regions (except South Asia). These findings are interpreted as evidence of exposure of 
microcredit to boom-bust cycles that characterise the traditional banking sector, thus pointing 
to the idea that rapid increases in lending by MFIs should be viewed as an indicator of either 
financial inclusion or financial distress.  Ahlin et al. (2011) address the question: Does MFI 
                                                          
7 During the 1980s, banking crises were experienced in the United Sates, Argentina, Chile, Czech Republic and 
Norway and during the 1990s in Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Venezuela, Mexico, Japan, Finland, 
Hungary, Brazil, Russia and Sweden (Mishkin, 2013) 
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success depend on the macro-institutional environment? Among other dependent variables, 
they considered extensive loan growth (number of borrowers) and intensive growth (average 
loan size). They find that the significant predictors of borrower growth include labor force 
participation, manufacturing value added and age of MFI. Predictors of loan-size growth were 
labor force participation, manufacturing value added and real GDP per capita. It is concluded 
that microeconomic factors as well as the macro-institutional environment do influence 
microfinance loan growth. 
Whereas Krauss and Walter (2009) and Wagner and Winkler (2013) focused on the correlations 
between financial crises and microfinance, Gonzales (2010) was more concerned with 
thresholds in loan growth – by seeking to determine how much growth would be considered 
too much. Using quadratic relationships, the study identifies the turning points along the credit 
curves and provides evidence to suggest that the growth of loans in microfinance was not very 
high during the 2003 – 2008 period. This was implicitly taken to mean that the rapid growth in 
microfinance markets was more of a “catch-up effect” (movement towards an equilibrium) 
rather than a shift towards disequilibrium.   
Some of the significant predictors of loan growth at the MFI-level as identified by Wagner and 
Winkler (2014) and Ahlin et al. (2011) include funding growth, credit risk, GDP growth, 
inflation, global financial crisis, current account balance, remittances, competition, size, 
political stability, corruption, labour force, age and manufacturing value added. Despite this 
evidence, there is yet no consensus as to which factors are most relevant in explaining credit 
expansion. The statistical significance of individual factors, as well as their signs and 
magnitudes vary across studies, thus, producing conflicting results. Moreover, an 
understanding of the drivers of credit growth in microfinance institutions is just an emerging 
area of research while the effect of some of these significant factors in SSA remains unknown.  
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Unlike MFIs, banks have been extensively researched partly because financial systems in many 
countries are bank-based (Mishkin, 2013) and partly because they face more exposure to 
international financial crises. In fact, early analyses of the rapid growth in credit were done in 
response to the credit market cycles of booms and busts in developed countries during the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s (Hofmann, 2001). Such studies examined bank credit booms and their 
drivers8 as well as the procyclicality of bank performance and the business cycle9. Credit booms 
have been defined as episodes of rapid credit growth (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012) especially when 
the annual growth rate of the bank credit to the private sector as a share of GDP exceeds 20 per 
cent (Barajas et al., 2007). With credit booms defined in this way, it was shown that not all of 
them were bad – there were “bad booms” and “good booms’’. Good booms were associated 
with economies movement towards the equilibrium, defined as a “catch-up effect”, but bad 
credit booms always fuelled economic crises. 
In order to test the hypothesis that credit growth was procyclical, the approach has been to 
regress credit to private sector as a share of GDP against an economic activity variable (such 
as GDP growth, GDP per capita, industrial production) and other control variables. A positive 
and significant coefficient on GDP is usually taken to imply that credit growth is dependent on 
GDP growth and the former is procyclical. In theory, favourable economic conditions boost 
spending by households and firms. This enhanced spending activity stimulates demand of 
credit (Hofmann, 2001). In line with theoretical expectations, there has been overwhelming 
evidence of bank credit growth being procyclical (Hofmann, 2004; Calza et al., 2003; Njoroge 
and Kamau, 2010). This finding is important for bank regulators because it suggests the need 
for countercyclical stabilization measures especially when credit booms can be predicted 
                                                          
8 See, for instance, Barajas et al., (2007); Bakker and Gulde (2010); Ali and Daly (2010); Kiss et al. (2006); 
Hofmann (2004); Aisen and Franken (2010); Coricelli et al., (2006); Mendoza et al., (2008); Ahmad and Ariff 
(2007) and many others 
9 See, for instance, Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Bikker and Hu (2002), Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012), 
Marcucci and Quagliariello (2009), Quagliariello (2007) and many others 
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beforehand. There is also a possibility of an inverse relationship between credit growth and 
GDP (Hofmann, 2001). This happens when firms switch from external to internal borrowing 
during an economic upswing which improves their cashflow position. A shift towards internal 
funds lowers demand for bank credit. 
 
Apart from GDP growth, other common regressors appearing in loan growth regression are 
inflation rate, interest rates and public debt (Hofmann, 2001; Calza et al., 2003; Brzoza-
Brzezina, 2005; Cottarelli et al., 2005). The GDP growth is usually included in the loan growth 
regressions to capture business cycle effects while the interest rate proxies the cost of credit in 
the economy. Inflation is used to capture macroeconomic instability. Public debt is usually used 
to proxy sovereign risk since high levels of debt may increase the risk that an economy will 
experience capital flight (Ali and Daly, 2010). A government can always deal with its debt by 
simply defaulting. The higher the government debt, the greater the temptation of default. 
External debt tends to be inversely correlated with loan growth. From theory, the effect of 
inflation on loan growth is indeterminate – it is either positive or negative (Wagner and Winkler, 
2013; Chaibi and Ftiti, 2015). The positive effect depends on whether inflation works via the 
labour market by reducing unemployment as hypothesized by Phillips curve or through an 
increase in loan servicing capacity due to a fall in the real value of the loan. The negative effect 
works through a fall in real incomes, which reduces the loan servicing capacity. Interest rate is 
included in the regressions to capture the cost of credit (Hofmann, 2001). A tight monetary 
policy evidenced by high interest rates, reduces bank liquidity and the capacity of banks to 
lend, hence reducing credit supply. Similarly, when the Central bank controls money via open 
market operations, the lowers reserves and loanable funds which decreases credit supply.  
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Bank loan growth regressions have also included institutional factors as predictors. Such 
factors include governance indicators and business environment indicators (Boutriga et al., 
2010; Breuer, 2006; Hermes et al., 2011). A few studies have made attempts to capture financial 
sector reforms, accounting standards, banking sector entry barriers and the origin of the legal 
system (Cotarelli et al., 2005). Following predictions of new institutional economics theory, it 
is expected that institutional variables will be positively and significantly correlated with loan 
growth. 
 
Regarding SSA, banking sector evidence indicates that the market structure of banks, their 
financial strength and regulatory capital are the broad determinants of lending behaviour 
(Amidu, 2014) whereas country-level evidence shows that the macroeconomic environment is 
a significant predictor of lending by banks (Njoroge and Kamau, 2010). Even though there are 
stark differences between microfinance and banking sectors, evidence from the microfinance 
markets in this region is lacking.  
 
In terms of modelling, previous microfinance studies (Wagner and Winkler, 2013; Ahlin et al., 
2011) on credit growth have assumed static relationships and ignored the dynamics of lending 
behaviour. They have used static models along with either random-effects or fixed-effects 
estimators that do not allow one to use observable information of previous periods in the model. 
Similarly, such estimators are limited in dealing with endogeneity biases that are common in 
social economic data. Using banking data, authors like Lane and McQuade (2014), Kiss et al., 
(2006), Amidu (2014), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) have 
captured dynamics in their models. However, most of these studies used a one-way error 
components model. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) expanded these models by using a two-way 
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error components model in which MFI-specific factors and country heterogeneities were 
controlled for.  
 
This study extends existing knowledge in microfinance in two ways. First, the study uses a 
dynamic model where loan growth is modelled to depend on its past realizations. The model is 
estimated using system GMM, which is an estimator that is versatile in dealing with panel 
endogeneity biases that arise from reverse causality, omitted variables and measurement errors. 
In addition, the study controls for idiosyncratic factors of the SSA region and provides evidence 
for a region that has been largely neglected in the relevant literature.   
 
2.3 Methodology and Data 
 
2.3.1 Model Specification  
Since this study is using panel data, loan growth, 𝑔𝑖𝑡, is observed over time, opening up the 
possibility of estimating parameters of dynamic models that specify the loan growth to depend 
in part on 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1, … … … 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−𝑝, which are its values in previous periods (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2010). Given this fact, some studies such as Kiss et al. (2006) as well as Lane and McQuade 
(2014) specify a one-way error components dynamic model which is an autoregressive model 
of order 1 in 𝑔𝑖𝑡 [an AR (1) model] with 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 as a regressor and X and W, as vectors. This 
specification is shown in equation (1). 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑿𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑾𝑡
′ 𝜌 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (1) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡     (2) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1 … . 𝑁;   𝑡 = 1 … . 𝑇                 
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Although panel data contains both cross sectional and time dimensions, equation (1) does not 
control for time-specific effects. In the studies reviewed in section 2, only Bouvatier and 
Lepetit (2012) accommodated time-specific effects in their models. Taking this into account, 
equation (1) is modified by incorporating time-specific effects to give equation (3), which is a 
two-way error components model.  
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑿𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑾𝑡
′ 𝜌 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (3) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡     (4) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1 … . 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1 … . 𝑇                 
The regressand 𝑔𝑖𝑡 is loan growth of MFI i in year t. Loan growth (𝑔𝑖𝑡) is the log difference in 
year-end gross loan portfolio. Vector 𝑿𝑖𝑡 contains MFI-level variables, which include credit 
risk, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, capital asset ratio and return on equity. Macro-institutional 
variables are contained in the vector 𝑾𝑡 . These variables include GDP growth, inflation, 
money supply, regulatory quality and ease of getting credit. MFI-specific and time-specific 
fixed effects are captured by 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜆𝑡 respectively while 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is white noise.   
In equation (3), 𝑔𝑖𝑡  is correlated over time directly through (i) 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 in preceding periods 
which is termed true state dependence; (ii) through observables 𝑿𝑖𝑡 and 𝑾𝑡, which is termed 
observable heterogeneity and (iii) indirectly through time invariant individual effect 𝜇𝑖 and 
time variant effect 𝜆𝑡,   which are collectively termed unobserved heterogeneity. These 
correlations generate the problem of “dynamic panel bias” (Roodman, 2009). To consistently 
estimate 𝛼, 𝛽 and ρ, for time varying regressors, 𝜇𝑖 can be eliminated by appropriate 
differencing transformation10.  
                                                          
10 ∆𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1∆𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∆𝑿𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + ∆𝑾𝑡
′ 𝜌 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡    𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒    ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 =   ∆𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝛥𝜆𝑡 
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First differencing transformations are not enough to deal with endogeneity biases and an 
application of OLS on equation (3) will produce inconsistent parameter estimates because the 
lagged term [𝛥𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1] is correlated with the error ∆𝑢𝑖𝑡, even if 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is serially uncorrelated. This 
correlation provides justification for the use of instrumental variable estimation where lagged 
dependent variables and exogenous variables enter as instruments as proposed by Anderson 
and Hsiao (1981). However, more efficient instrumental variable estimators termed Arellano-
Bond estimators can be obtained by using more lags of the dependent variable as instruments 
(Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988). According to Cameron and Trivedi (2010), the Arellano-Bond 
estimator assumes that 𝐸(𝑔𝑖𝑡∆𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0  for s≤t-2 so that the lags 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−2, 𝑔𝑖,𝑡−3, … … can be used 
as instruments in the first differenced model.  
According to Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), it is possible to obtain 
another estimator which is more precise and which exhibits better finite sample properties. This 
can be implemented by imposing an additional condition 𝐸(∆𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0 so that the levels 
(equation 3) can be incorporated and  ∆𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 can serve as instruments. This builds a system of 
two equations where the equation in levels applies lagged first differences as instruments while 
the equation in first differences applies lagged levels as instruments. Adapting this approach, 
this study will apply the two-step GMM version of the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) extensions which accommodate unobserved heterogeneity as well as 
endogeneity.  
2.3.2 Data Description and Sources 
Data was assembled from four sources – MIX dataset of the Microfinance Information 
eXchange (www.mixmarket.org) and World Development Indicators, World Governance 
Indicators and Doing Business Indicators datasets of the World Bank. The MIX data is merged 
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with country-level data from the World Development Indicators, Doing Business Indicators 
and World Governance Indicators. The data used for this study covers the period 2004-2014.  
 
The MIX dataset is a global unbalanced MFI-level panel. The number of MFIs in the sample 
over the 2004-2014 period is 2687 for the global sample but 745 for SSA, 393 for East Asia 
and the Pacific (EAP), 483 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), 562 for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC), 423 for South Asia (SA) and 80 for Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). Regarding the number of observations, the total sample has 16,383 observations 
distributed regionally as follows: SSA (3122), SA (2379), LAC (3898), EECA (2592), EAP 
(1833) and MENA (559). The sample covers 120 countries, which are listed in Appendix Table 
A3. The sample includes 37 countries from SSA, 16 from EAP, 24 from EECA, 26 from LAC, 
10 from MENA and 7 from SA.  
 
2.3.3 Definition and Measurement of Variables 
The dependent variable, loan growth is the log difference in year-end gross loan portfolio 
(gross loan portfolio represents total amount of all loans outstanding). All MFI-specific 
variables are drawn from the MIX dataset. Four MFI-level variables are used: lagged loan 
growth, credit risk, capital asset ratio and return on equity. In addition, the level of market 
concentration in the MFI sector is proxied by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Basega-Pascual 
et al., 2015; Wagner and Winkler, 2013). It is computed using the following formula; 𝐻𝐻𝐼 =
∑ 𝑆𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1  where 𝑆𝑖 is the market share of firm i in total n firms in the country being considered. 
The effect of competition on loan growth is mixed. High competition in a saturated market 
adversely affects loan growth. However, higher competition can also mean higher efficiency 
in the delivery of loans.  
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Lagged loan growth is used to capture persistence in loan growth over time or conditional 
convergence. Ideally, loan growth at time t contains some information from its previous values 
(𝑔𝑡−1, … . 𝑔𝑡−𝑝). Due to persistence in loan growth, the value of loan growth in previous periods 
is expected to predict the current level of loan growth (Lane and McQuade, 2014). The 
coefficient on lagged loan growth indicates the speed at which the loan growth reverts to the 
long-run equilibrium (Chikalipah, 2018). Literature on conditional convergence (see Fung, 
2009; Asongu, 2013; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016) suggests that convergence is established 
when two criteria are met. Firstly, 𝛼1 should be statistically significant. Secondly, the absolute 
value of the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable should be within the 
interval of zero and one (0<|𝛼1|<1). However, the speed of convergence can be derived by 
subtracting 1 from the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (𝛼1 − 1).       
Credit risk is measured as the sum of portfolio at risk and the write-off ratio (Gonzalez, 2011; 
Wagner and Winkler, 2013; Sinkey and Greenwalt, 1991).  Portfolio at risk is the proportion 
of loans in the gross loan portfolio of an MFI that has been overdue for more than 30 days 
while the write-off ratio is the share of loans in the portfolio that are written off. Credit risk 
measures the quality of an MFI’s loan portfolio and gives the probability that the MFI loan 
assets will suffer from default. The relationship between credit risk and loan growth is 
embedded in the real business cycle theory which postulates that MFIs will suffer a high default 
risk due to reduced household and firm earnings during a recession. In response to increased 
risk exposure, MFIs tend to reduce lending by raising the credit standards and lending rates of 
interest in order to minimize further likelihood of default. Thus, it is expected that there will 
be a negative relationship between credit risk and loan growth.  
Capital asset ratio is the proportion of total equity in total assets. It is used to account for an 
MFI’s stability (Amidu, 2014). A higher capital asset ratio boosts an MFI’s solvency, meaning 
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that it holds a sufficient capital buffer to support its assets. According to Mishkin (2013), a 
highly capitalised firm faces less risk exposure because the owners have an incentive to pursue 
less risky ventures. It does this by becoming more stringent in underwriting loans and 
monitoring them, which reduces lending growth but minimizes loan default. Therefore, it is 
expected that there will be an inverse relationship between the capital asset ratio and loan 
growth. 
Return on equity is a proxy for management efficiency (Love and Ariss, 2014). It is expected 
that correlation between loan growth and return on equity will be either positive or negative. 
Efficiency in lending may lead to a decrease in loan growth in view of the lemons problem. 
Return on equity can also be associated with an increase in lending if profitability is associated 
with an economic upswing combined with an increase in demand for credit. 
This study considers three macroeconomic variables, which are drawn from the World 
Development Indicators database of the World Bank. These variables are GDP growth, 
inflation and money supply. Following Ahlin et al. (2011) and Wagner and Winkler (2013), 
this study controls for GDP growth, which is measured as the annual percentage change in real 
GDP per capita. GDP growth captures business cycle effects. Both business cycle theory and 
evidence support procyclicality between economic expansion and lending growth (Hofmann, 
2001; Calza et al., 2003; Njoroge and Kamau, 2010; Ahlin et al., 2011).  
Inflation is measured by the annual percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI). The 
effect of inflation on loan growth is ambiguous. The positive effect works via two channels. 
The first channel is based on the Phillip curve hypothesis, which postulates an inverse 
relationship between inflation and unemployment. Higher inflation is associated with lower 
unemployment and higher capacity to service loans. The second channel works through the 
effect of inflation on the real value of the loan. The real value of the loan tends to fall when 
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inflation is high (Wagner and Winkler, 2013). High inflation can also adversely affect loan 
growth. This occurs because high inflation reduces real incomes and therefore adversely affects 
loan servicing ability (Chaibi and Ftiti, 2014). 
Money supply is broad money (M3) as a percentage of GDP. It is used to capture financial 
sector depth or the size of the financial sector (Wagner and Winkler, 2013). The relationship 
between loan growth and financial depth is mixed (Ahlin et al. 2011). Demand for microcredit 
may fall where financial development opens up opportunities for microentrepreneurs in formal 
financial institutions. Conversely, MFIs might be pushed by the developed banking sector to 
lend to the micro-entrepreneurs.  
Two institutional variables are used in this study: regulatory quality (drawn from the World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank) and ease of getting credit (drawn from Doing 
Business Indicators of the World Bank). It is expected that these indicators will have a positive 
correlation with loan growth because good institutions have been hypothesized to smoothen 
the functioning of factor and product markets as well as the operations of the state (McMullen 
et al., 2008; North, 1990; Ahlin et al. 2011). Regulatory quality is a perception index ranging 
from -2.5 (weak governance performance) to +2.5 (strong governance performance). It 
measures “the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that accelerate the development of the private sector” (Indicators, 2015). Ease of 
getting credit is measured in terms of distance to the frontier on a 0 to 100 scale. It measures 
“the legal rights of borrowers and lenders with respect to secured transactions and the reporting 
of credit information” (Business, 2017).  
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2.4 Empirical Results 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Results in Appendix Table A5 indicate that most of the variables are not normally distributed 
since their skewness and kurtosis values are at variance with the conventional skewness of 0 
and kurtosis of 3 for a normal distribution. The skewness and kurtosis values for loan growth 
are 3 and 26, respectively implying that the distribution is positively skewed with fat tails. That 
means the error term in equation (3) is also likely to be non-normal. In view of this, GMM 
estimators are deployed to allow reliable estimation of the parameters when the distribution of 
the error term is not normal. 
Table 1 indicates that there are significant mean differences between SSA and non-SSA 
regarding loan growth, market concentration, GDP growth, inflation, regulatory quality and 
ease of getting credit. The macroeconomic and institutional environment in SSA countries lags 
behind the environment existing in non-SSA countries. Relative to non-SSA, economic growth 
is lower and inflation higher in SSA while regulatory quality is poorer and getting credit more 
difficult.   
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Table 1: Comparisons – SSA and non-SSA 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 Non-SSA SSA Difference t-ratio 
Loan growth (ratio) 0.26 0.29 -0.026* (-2.14) 
Credit risk (ratio) 0.31 0.12 0.192 (0.51) 
Mkt concentration (index) 0.03 0.06 -0.03*** (-29.79) 
Capital asset ratio 0.35 0.32 0.034 (1.32) 
Return on equity (ratio) 0.15 -0.09 0.236 (0.32) 
Money supply (%) 22.4 28.5 -6.11 (-0.92) 
GDP growth (%) 4.55 2.58 1.97*** (25.40) 
Inflation (%) 4.96 7.79 -2.83*** (-9.73) 
Regulatory quality (index) -0.34 -0.50 0.16*** (16.34) 
Ease of getting credit (index) 43.6 33.08 10.5*** (24.04) 
 
Table 1 shows that the pace of loan growth is faster in SSA countries compared to non-SSA 
countries. This pace of loan growth is not only essential for sustainability but is also an 
indicator of positive impact. The loan growth rate of 29% is considered to be fairly high. At 
the country level, however, the rate of loan growth in microfinance markets is far from uniform 
(see Appendix Table A4). The top five loan growth markets include Guinea Bissau, Namibia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon and Gambia. However, receding markets include 
Comoros and Zimbabwe. 
 
Results presented in Appendix Table A4 show that an average MFI in SSA is loss-making 
while an average MFI in non-SSA regions is profit-making. Almost 50% of the countries in 
SSA record negative profits. Perhaps MFIs in SSA deploy microfinance assets to pursue their 
social mission rather than achieve financial sustainability. On a positive note, about 32.4% and 
35% of microfinance assets are supported by capital in SSA and non-SSA respectively. This 
reflects some financial stability given that the threshold is 12%, owing to the more volatile and 
riskier environments in which MFIs operate (Berger, 2010).  
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2.4.2 Regression Results 
Before performing regression analysis (whose results are reported in Tables 2 and 3), the data 
was checked for collinearity among explanatory variables by computing the correlation matrix 
(see Appendix Table A6). All the correlation coefficients are small (less than 0.5) implying 
that multicollinearity is not a problem. After running the regressions, the results were checked 
for proper specification by applying the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in the 
differenced errors and the F-test for joint significance of the coefficients. All the regressions 
are statistically significant at 1%. Considering AR (1), the p-values are below 0.10 except in 
the regression for EAP while a look at the AR (2) shows that the associated p-values exceed 
0.10 except in the regression for EECA. These AR (1) and AR (2) tests imply that the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected. When implementing the AR test, the 
statistical significance of the AR (1) is not the main focus because the model has been designed 
to allow autocorrelated errors (Roodman, 2009). However, the focus is on AR (2), which is 
supposed to be independent of the regressors. Almost all the regressions satisfy the AR (2) test.  
2.4.2.1 Determinants of Loan Growth in SSA: Baseline Model 
The primary focus of this study is to identify the factors that significantly explain differences 
in loan growth between 2004 and 2014. However, the sample is broken down into two periods 
(2004-2008 and 2009-2014) to correspond to phases of high loan growth (37% per year) and 
phases of low loan growth (16% per year) (see Appendix Figure A1 Panel A). 
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Table 2: Determinants of loan growth in SSA – Baseline results 
 Dependent variable: log loan growth 
 2004-2014 2004-2008 2009-2014 
Log loan growth (L1) 0.04*** 0.11** -0.03** 
 (0.013) (0.044) (0.014) 
Credit risk -0.79*** -0.62*** -0.73*** 
 (0.033) (0.067) (0.099) 
Mkt concentration  -0.45 -13.40 3.87*** 
 (0.604) (14.732) (1.028) 
Capital asset ratio 0.10** 0.19 -0.05 
 (0.049) (0.120) (0.106) 
Return on equity 0.02 0.13*** -0.01 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Money supply -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
GDP growth 0.01*** 0.01 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) 
Inflation -0.00 -0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Regulatory quality 0.15*** -0.76*** 0.38*** 
 (0.037) (0.245) (0.055) 
Ease of getting credit -0.00*** -0.01 0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.017) (0.001) 
No of observations 712 361 351 
Wald Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR(1) [p-value] 0.002 0.063 0.005 
AR(2) [p-value] 0.159 0.204 0.88 
Sargan [p-value] 0.778 0.349 0.70 
The dependent variable is loan growth (in logs). Endogenous variable is lagged loan growth while the rest of 
the variables are treated as exogenous. Two-step system GMM estimator, standard errors (in parentheses) and 
small-sample adjustments were applied. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. Results for Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first differenced errors (H0=there 
is no autocorrelation) and Wald-Chi2 test for joint significance of parameters are reported. Results of Sargan 
test for overidentifying restrictions (H0=overidentifying restrictions are valid) are also reported. (L1) indicates 
the first lag. Time dummies are included in the regression but not reported.  
 
Baseline results show that micro-level, macroeconomic and institutional factors are significant 
predictors of loan growth in SSA not only between 2004 and 2014 but also during the 2004-
2008 period and the 2009-2014 period. Predictors of loan growth for the entire period (2004-
2014) include lagged loan growth, credit risk, capital asset ratio, GDP growth, regulatory 
quality and the ease of getting credit.  
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During 2004-2014, loan growth in MFIs is higher when credit risk and the ease of getting credit 
are lower and when capitalisation, GDP growth and regulatory quality are higher. However, a 
comparison of the results for the 2004-2008 and the 2009-2014 period reveals three 
relationships. The first finding is that the factors that were statistically significant during the 
2004-2008 period do not necessarily remain statistically significant during the 2009-2014 
period. Secondly, four variables, namely, lagged loan growth, credit risk, inflation and 
regulatory quality were statistically significant during both periods. However, inflation, 
regulatory quality and lagged loan growth reversed their signs over the two periods. The third 
finding is that market concentration, GDP growth and ease of getting credit, which were not 
significant during 2004-2008, became significant during 2009-2014 while return on equity was 
statistically significant during 2004-2008 but became insignificant during 2009-20014. This 
suggests that the explanatory factors change when the loan growth phases change.      
Tests for conditional convergence show that loan growth is persistent. Testing for conditional 
convergence requires the fulfilment of two criteria (see Fung, 2009; Asongu, 2013; Asongu 
and Nwachukwu, 2016). First, the estimated coefficient on lagged loan growth should be 
statistically significant. Lastly, the absolute value of the estimated coefficient on lagged loan 
growth should lie between zero and one. The results in Table 2 suggest that the coefficients on 
lagged loan growth satisfy these two criteria during all the different periods analysed. A 1% 
increase in past loan growth is associated with a 0.04% increase in current loan growth during 
the 2004-2014 period. This indicates that loan growth over this period was higher among those 
MFIs that were already having high loan growth rates. The same persistence is evident during 
2004-2008 and 2009-2014.  These findings imply that dynamics matter for loan growth in 
MFIs. After experiencing a fast growth in loans in the past, rational MFI managers increased 
growth in their lending, especially if increased lending was driven by demand-shifts in the 
economy. However, when lending is driven by supply-shifts in the credit markets, it is likely 
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to result in low quality loans. The same thing happens if growth in lending is associated with 
weak monitoring capacity, it also results in low quality loans and will lower future lending as 
the lenders become more stringent.     
Credit risk is statistically significant with a negative sign. A one-unit increase in credit risk 
lowers loan growth by 79% during 2004 – 2014, 62% during 2004-2008 and 73% during 2009-
2014.  This result is consistent with the findings by Wagner and Winkler (2013) and confirms 
a trade-off between loan growth and risk so that MFIs that face more risk lend much less. This 
is explained by risk-averse behaviour among managers of MFIs as they respond to adverse 
selection and moral hazard in lending. Falling loan quality is accompanied by a more 
conservative loan strategy by MFI management. MFI managers find it rational to tighten 
lending, showing less willingness to either advance new loans or renew existing loans. This 
can be achieved by raising underwriting standards, which deters new loans to customers.  
Capital asset ratio has a positive and significant effect on loan growth during 2004-2014. This 
suggests that more capitalised MFIs tend to adopt an aggressive lending policy because they 
can achieve efficient scales of operations that are not feasible for less capitalised MFIs (Clair, 
1992). Effectively, an increase in the capital asset ratio by one unit increases loan growth by 
10%. Surprisingly, the capital asset ratio does not remain statistically significant when the data 
is broken down into two periods (2004-2008 and 2009-2014). This means the role of this 
variable depends on the period under consideration.  
Evidence supports procyclicality between economic upswings and lending growth in MFIs 
(Hofmann, 2004; Calza et al., 2003; Ahlin et al., 2011). This relationship is clear during 2004-
2014 and 2009-2014 but is not detected during 2004-2008. The results show that a one-unit 
increase in GDP growth is associated with a 1% increase in loan growth. This is attributed to 
increased demand for loans which follows increases in economy-wide aggregate demand.  
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Results for 2004-2014 show that political and business institutions provide a conducive 
environment for lending but they also hinder lending growth by MFIs suggesting that the effect 
of institutions on credit growth is ambiguous. Better regulatory quality predicts higher loan 
growth whereas ease of getting credit predicts slower lending growth during 2008-2014. This 
suggests that reforms that have sought to promote legal rights of borrowers and lenders with 
respect to secured transactions and the reporting of credit information have instead made it 
costlier for MFIs to increase lending in a fully compliant way (Ahlin et al., 2011). There is a 
possibility that such reforms are generating better opportunities outside the micro-credit sector, 
which reduces the dependence on MFI services and weakens loan growth in MFIs.  
2.4.2.2 A Global Analysis of Loan Growth Determinants  
This section compares results for the loan growth determinants in SSA countries to those in 
other regions (Table 3). The comparisons are meant to determine whether these factors are 
important predictors of loan growth differences in other regions (EAP, EECA, LAC, SA). 
These comparisons are useful because explanations for loan growth that are supported by 
empirical evidence in one region may not apply in other regions.  
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Table 3: Determinants of loan growth – International comparisons 
 Dependent variable: log loan growth 
 SSA EAP EECA LA SA World 
Log loan growth (L1) 0.04*** -0.02*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.22*** 0.12*** 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.015) (0.013) 
Credit risk -0.79*** -0.31*** 0.00*** -1.51*** -0.21** 0.00*** 
 (0.033) (0.054) (0.000) (0.059) (0.096) (0.000) 
Mkt concentration  -0.45 -1.40*** -5.08*** -2.75 16.47** -12.72 
 (0.604) (0.428) (1.054) (2.370) (6.512) (14.611) 
Capital asset ratio 0.10** -0.54*** -0.11* -0.50*** 0.06 -0.03 
 (0.049) (0.032) (0.060) (0.040) (0.057) (0.035) 
Return on equity 0.02 0.01** 0.01 -0.03*** -0.00*** -0.01*** 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.021) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Money supply -0.00 0.00*** -0.01*** 0.00* -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
GDP growth 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Inflation -0.00 0.03*** -0.00 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Regulatory quality 0.15*** -0.58*** 0.41*** 0.20*** 0.43** 0.06 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.043) (0.015) (0.172) (0.053) 
Ease of getting credit -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
No of observations 712 677 747 1,793 1,271 5,359 
Wald chi2[p-value] 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AR (1) [p-value] 0.002 0.709 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.00 
AR (2) [p-value] 0.159 0.208 0.021 0.274 0.503 0.758 
Sargan [p-value] 0.778 0.999 0.854 0.268 0.98 0.063 
The dependent variable is log loan growth. Endogenous variable is lagged loan growth while the rest of the 
variables are treated as exogenous. Two-step system GMM estimators, standard errors (in parentheses) and 
small-sample adjustments were applied. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.  Results for Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first differenced errors (H0=there 
is no autocorrelation) and Wald Chi2 test for joint significance of parameters are reported. Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions (H0=overidentifying restrictions are valid) is also reported. (L1) indicates the first 
lag. All region-specific regressions include time dummies but the regression for World includes both time effects 
and regional effects. A constant is not included in the regressions. Results for MENA are excluded due to few 
observations. 
 
The following observations stand out from Table 3. Firstly, the results indicate that dynamics 
matter for loan growth globally and in all regions. Persistence of loan growth is highest in SA 
where a 1% increase in past loan growth is associated with 0.22% increase in current loan 
growth. In EECA, a past loan growth of 1% is associated with a 0.15% increase in current loan 
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growth. LA (0.9%) and SSA (0.4%). In these regions, loan growth was higher among those 
MFIs where loan growth was already high.    
The second notable observation is that micro-level, macroeconomic and institutional factors 
are significant predictors of loan growth in all regions. However, specific factors that 
significantly affect loan growth in SSA do not remain statistically significant in the models for 
EAP, EECA, LAC and SA. Only two factors significantly predict loan growth in all regions: 
credit risk and regulatory quality. The remaining factors differ by region. For example, in SSA, 
loan growth is higher in MFIs that are highly capitalised and those that operate in countries 
with higher economic growth and ease of getting credit index. Loan growth in EAP is driven 
by market concentration, capital asset ratio, return on equity, money supply, GDP growth and 
inflation. In EECA, it is market concentration, capital asset ratio, money supply, GDP growth 
and ease of getting credit that influence loan growth while the following factors determine loan 
growth in LAC: capital asset ratio, return on equity, money supply, GDP growth and inflation. 
Loan growth in SA is driven by market concentration, return on equity, money supply and 
inflation. At the global level, it is return on equity, money supply, GDP growth, inflation and 
ease of getting credit that explain variations in loan growth. These differences in explanatory 
factors are driven by regional heterogeneity and suggest the need for region-specific 
microcredit outreach interventions.  
Finally, the fact that GDP growth and money supply are statistically significant in four out of 
the five regions (and globally) implies that these are the key avenues through which 
macroeconomic shocks are transmitted to the balance sheets of MFIs (via stocks of gross loan 
portfolio). In terms of policy, this implies that monetary policy and other policies affecting 
aggregate demand could be applied to manage instabilities in the MFI sector.  
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2.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
While there has been some research effort toward understanding the key drivers of the rapid 
growth in lending recorded in microfinance markets, existing knowledge is inconclusive and 
limited. As such, the aim of this chapter was twofold: to identify the factors that determine loan 
growth differences in SSA and to explore whether any international differences exist in the 
way such factors affect loan growth. To achieve these two objectives, data was assembled from 
the MIX database, World Development Indicators, World Governance Indicators database and 
Doing Business Indicators database. This data was merged and used to run regression equations 
applying system GMM estimators.    
The results show that micro-level, macroeconomic and institutional factors are significant 
predictors of loan growth in SSA over the period 2004-2014. Specific factors that explain 
variations in loan growth include lagged loan growth, credit risk, capital asset ratio, GDP 
growth, regulatory quality and the ease of getting credit. This study has also confirmed that the 
factors that significantly affect loan growth in SSA do not remain statistically significant in 
regression equations for EAP, EECA, LAC and SA. These differences in explanatory factors 
suggests that interventions designed and directed to spur the expansion of microcredit should 
be region-specific and should focus on the most important factors in each region. 
Five key recommendations can be drawn from the study’s findings. Overwhelming evidence 
suggests that dynamics matter for loan growth in all regions, implying that loan growth is 
persistent. Credit management methodologies can be revised accordingly, as credit scoring, 
credit appraisals and other processes that incorporate past loan performance in their current 
loan projections are likely to perform better. 
The second recommendation is based on the finding that credit risk is negatively associated 
with loan growth in SSA and in all other regions. This implies that there is a trade-off between 
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growth in lending and the accumulation of non-performing loans. Since MFI managers are risk-
averse, high volumes of non-performing loans may push them to tighten lending standards. 
Regulators should encourage MFIs to efficiently manage their loan portfolios because this 
lowers their risk exposure and boosts lending activity.  
Thirdly, the level of capitalisation is associated with higher lending growth because MFIs with 
high capital asset ratios are more stable. In other words, such MFIs hold sufficient capital to 
support their assets. In terms of policy, this finding implies that the level of capitalisation 
affects loan growth and can be used as a prudential regulation tool to control lending in MFIs, 
as is the case in the banking industry.  
Fourthly, the fact that GDP growth and money supply are statistically significant in four out of 
the five regions (and globally) implies that these two factors are potential channels through 
which macroeconomic shocks are transmitted to the balance sheets of MFIs (via stocks of gross 
loan portfolio). As such, MFIs are sensitive to monetary policy impulses and other policies 
affecting aggregate demand. This finding supports the recommendation that monetary policies 
can be applied to mitigate instabilities in the MFI sector.  
Finally, this study found that the effect of institutional factors on loan growth is ambiguous. 
This suggests that the impact of institutional reforms on lending in MFIs may not be predictable 
beforehand, and also implies that the effects of such reforms may negate the expected 
outcomes. To remedy such situations, institutional reforms should be well sequenced so that 
complementarities and conflicts among their different components are ironed out to maximize 
their anticipated positive impact. 
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Chapter 3 
Determinants of Credit Risk in Sub-Saharan Africa Microfinance 
Institutions 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Financial distress facing microfinance institutions (MFIs) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and in 
other regions of the world has elicited concerns regarding the financial health of the 
microfinance sector. Riquet and Poursat (2013) reported that between 2001 and 2011, 25 MFIs 
in WAEMU11 and four in CEMAC12 were placed in temporary government administration13. 
Pride Zambia (Zambia) and African Bank (South Africa) — some of the largest MFIs in their 
countries - collapsed in 2009 and 2014, respectively. In Morocco, a loan growth of 59% 
between 2004 and 2008 resulted in 12 MFIs facing loan delinquency as portfolio at risk rose 
from 6% in 2008 to 10% in 2009. In the first quarter of 2013, up to 30 MFIs collapsed in Ghana 
and later in the year, an additional 20 also became insolvent (Boateng et al., 2016). All these 
episodes of ailing and failing microfinance institutions reveal a rising trend of financial crises 
in microfinance markets in SSA. This has been attributed to excessive market growth, 
insufficient institutional capabilities, predatory lending, systemic fraud, loss of focus, design 
                                                          
11 West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) comprises eight countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.  
12 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) comprises six countries: Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad. 
13 Temporary government administration (TGA) is imposed by regulators when the poor management of a 
financial institution threatens its financial health and/or the interests of its clients, especially depositors (Riquet 
and Poursat, 2013). 
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flaws and overzealous government intervention (Lutzenkirchen and Weistroffer, 2012; 
Marulanda et al., 2010). 
The level of credit risk in MFIs has been trending upwards. Median credit risk rose from around 
3.6% in 2000 to 8.2% in 2010, after which there was a slight reversal of the trend (see Appendix 
Figure A2 Panel A). Appendix Figure A2 Panel B shows that there has been notable variability 
in microcredit risk. The highest standard deviation of 22% was recorded in 2002, which implies 
that the difference between the observed risk levels and the mean risk in that year was about 
22% on average. 
Given these episodes of MFI collapse and increasing portfolio risk, examining the drivers of 
credit risk in these institutions has become a key issue for regulators (local and international), 
microfinance practitioners and researchers.  At the global level, there has been limited research 
interest in understanding the determinants of credit risk in microfinance markets. Earlier 
attempts focused on the relationship between credit risk, on one hand, and on the other hand: 
group lending methodology (Crabb and Keller, 2006), macroeconomic shocks (Gonzalez, 
2007), the gender factor (Schmit and Marrez, 2010; and D’espallier et al., 2011), the 
excessiveness of loan growth (Gonzalez, 2010) and loan size (Chikalipah, 2018). More recent 
efforts towards understanding credit risk determinants are by Sainz-Fernandez et al. (2015) and 
Yimga (2016), who conducted more comprehensive analyses of credit risk in MFIs. However, 
the study by Sainz-Fernandez et al. (2015) specifies static relationships which do not account 
for dynamic aspects of credit risk while Yimga’s (2016) dynamic study does not control for 
institutional factors. Except for Chikalipah (2018), existing knowledge does not focus on 
microfinance on SSA yet the median credit risk is significantly higher in SSA compared to 
other regions. Appendix Figure A3 shows that between 2000 and 2014, median credit risk is 
7.1% in SSA while it is 6.6% in LAC, 4.3% in EAP, 3.2% in MENA, 2.9% in EECA and 2.0% 
in SA. The study by Chikalipah (2018) fails to account for macro-institutional environment yet 
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there exists both theoretical (North, 1990; McMullen et al., 2008) and empirical (Ahlin et al., 
2017) evidence supporting the link between macro-institutional factors and performance of 
firms. Similarly, most past studies applied random effects and fixed effects estimators without 
controlling for endogeneity, which arises due to reverse causality, omitted variables and 
measurement errors. The studies did not test for non-linearities in the relationship between 
credit risk and loan growth. 
Given the preceding shortfalls in the existing literature, the purpose of this study is to identify 
both micro-level and macro-institutional determinants of credit risk in MFIs in SSA and 
establish whether these factors have heterogenous effects on credit risk in other regions of the 
world. The study contributes to microfinance literature by not only documenting determinants 
of loan risk in SSA but also by identifying predictors of credit risk in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), Middle East and Northern Africa 
(MENA) and South Asia (SA). In addition, the study captures the dynamics of credit risk by 
dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators, which deal with dynamic panel 
bias (Roodman, 2009). It extends the evidence on the relationship between credit risk and loan 
growth by identifying the tipping pints in this relationship.  
 
Findings from this study suggest that the main determinants of risk in SSA are lagged credit 
risk, loan growth, provision for loan impairment, GDP per capita growth and ease of getting 
credit. In addition, the study finds that the effect of loan growth on credit risk in SSA is non-
linear so that loan growth rates below 36.8% are associated with increased credit quality but 
loan growth rates above 36.8% contribute to falling loan quality in SSA. Although lagged credit 
risk, loan growth and provision for loan impairment significantly affect credit risk in all 
regions, the magnitudes of the effects vary by region. The results show that some factors are 
more important in some regions than in others. For example, GDP per capita growth is only 
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important in reducing credit risk in SSA, EECA and LAC whereas inflation is only important 
in enhancing credit risk in EAP and SA. Results also reveal divergencies in the turning points 
across the regions regarding the non-linear relationship between credit risk and loan growth. 
EAP reports the turning point at 363%, EECA at 164% and LAC at 108%.   
After providing the foremost motivation for the study in this Section, this paper continues with 
a literature review of credit risk determinants in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, the empirical model 
is specified and data is described. Section 3.4 provides the regression results, which is followed 
by concluding remarks in Section 3.5.  
3.2 Literature Review 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical Literature 
A review of the theoretical literature identifies the drivers of credit risk as microeconomic 
factors (principal-agent model), macroeconomic factors (financial accelerator theory) and 
institutional factors (new institutional economics). Principal-agent model is based on the 
neoclassical theory, which considers financial institutions as intermediaries of funds between 
surplus units (lender – savers) and deficit units (borrower-investors) (Freixas and Xavier, 2008; 
Mishkin, 2013). This function of financial intermediaries is unique for three reasons. Firstly, 
loan contracts are heterogeneously designed to reflect the quality of the borrowers (Kimuyu 
and Omiti, 2000). Secondly, exchange involves making intertemporal consumption decisions 
(Kimuyu and Omiti, 2000). Lastly, exchange is exposed to the “lemons problem” due to the 
presence of financial frictions and transaction costs (Joshi, 2005; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Given these features of financial markets, the shareholders (principal-owners), who are the 
owners of the financial intermediary (hereafter, referred to as FI) delegate the day-to-day 
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decision making to the manager (the agent - manager) and give out loans to borrowers (agent-
borrowers).  
Agency theory suggests that rational agent-managers will pursue self-interest in order to fulfil 
their utility maximization objective whereas the objective of the principal-owners is to 
maximize FI value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agent-managers are minority shareholders 
with less than 100% of residual claims. Motivated by adverse incentives, agent-managers 
exercise their power for personal gain. In doing so, adverse selection and moral hazard costs 
arise since agent-managers have incentives to hide information regarding their risk attitude, 
their goals as well as the feasibility of their projects (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) even though it 
is either impractical or impossible for the principal-owners to verify these attitudes, goals and 
project feasibility. These levels of interaction expose the FI to principal-agent conflicts, as well 
as to adverse selection, moral hazard and incentive problems. 
The existence of agency costs implies that the actions of the agent-manager will affect FI 
riskiness through three main channels: free cash flows, debt overhang and asset substitution 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Schleifer and Vishny, 1989 and Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
Whenever there are free cash flows, the agent-manager will invest profit in wasteful ventures 
such as perks and empire building. This behaviour destroys the value of the FI. Low value of 
the FI lowers its net worth and with it its debt servicing capacity. Ultimately, the FI’s 
insolvency is increased. The debt overhang channel works when the agent-manager gives out 
more loans to highly indebted customers or engages in excessive lending behaviour. This has 
the effect of increasing the default rate and the FI’s riskiness. Lastly, the manager can invest in 
negative net present value (NPV) rather than positive NPV projects. Over time, this has an 
adverse effect on the FI’s share price. 
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The trade-off theory postulates that self-interested agent-managers tend to favour a low 
leverage policy because issues of outside equity invite financial slack and lower the disciplining 
effect of debt (Graham, 1996, 2000; Wald, 1999 and Myers, 1984). This is explained by the 
relatively lower risk that accompanies issues of equity compared to issues of debt as the latter 
increases the exposure of the FI to financial distress and requires higher interest rates to 
compensate for the additional risk. Therefore, the pursuit of a low leverage policy implicitly 
reflects the existence of moral hazard.  
Agency problems also arise during the negotiation of loan contracts between the agent-manager 
and the agent-borrower. According to Armendariz and Murdoch (2010), these informational 
problems arise at three levels: before extending the loan, once the loan has been granted and 
once the business returns have materialized. Before extending the loan, the agent-manager has 
no way of knowing the quality of the borrower, and there is sufficient risk that the agent-
borrower may turn out to be a low-quality borrower. This breeds the adverse selection problem 
for the agent-manager. Once the loan has been extended, monitoring difficulties will make it 
difficult for the agent-manager to know whether the agent-borrower will put the loan to good 
use and whether the loan will be diverted towards unproductive investments. This generates 
the moral hazard problem for the agent-manager. After the project has yielded returns, the 
agent-manager has no way of verifying the amount of project returns but the agent-borrower 
has an incentive to hide the true level of returns thus exposing the former to adverse section 
problems.  
Business cycle movements generate boom-bust cycles that amplify correlations between risk 
and loan growth (Clair, 1992; Keeton, 1999; Bernanke et al., 1994). Economic upswings are 
accompanied with better economic conditions, better prospects, higher consumption and 
investment (Hofmann, 2004). The financial accelerator theory argues that good economic 
prospects increase bank lending because firm profits and assets rise during an upward swing. 
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This results in higher household and firm indebtedness as credit standards decline while interest 
rates fall in response to optimistic customer expectations. However, a reversal in economic 
prospects leads to an accumulation of non-performing loans since many debtors are likely to 
default on their loans. 
New institutional economics hypothesizes a positive effect of institutions in smoothening the 
functioning of factor (labour and capital) and product markets as well as the operations of the 
state (McMullen et al., 2008; North, 1990; Ahlin et al. 2011). The most common institutional 
variables appearing in the literature include voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule of law. Rule of law 
measures the level to which citizens trust societal rules and agree to be bound by them, as they 
relate to the enforcement of contracts, property rights, the police service and the judiciary 
(Indicators, 2015). Once a society becomes accustomed to obeying laws, it will also find itself 
similarly accustomed to honouring loan obligations (Breuer, 2006). This leads to mutual 
interest in the actions of both banks and borrowers implying that problem loans will be lower.  
Government stability is associated with application of rules and regulations that can be 
predicted in advance and a political environment that is more certain (World Bank, 2016).  
When this is the case, lenders and borrowers have no room to gamble by acting outside those 
rules and regulations because the implication of their actions can be known in advance (Breuer, 
2006). Returns to investment and employment will be certain – improving planning for loan 
servicing and loan repayment. Bad loans will be lower in such countries. Voice and 
accountability capture the extent to which a country's citizens are free to vote, to express 
themselves and to associate. This implies that rules, regulations and policies that emanate from 
MFIs and other financial intermediaries will be a product of consultative processes and 
information sharing, which minimizes conflicts of interest. Such an environment lowers the 
incidence of bad loans in the financial system.  
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Government effectiveness captures the commitment by government to independently design 
and implement public programmes. Commitment by government leadership has demonstration 
or spill-over effects on the citizenry. As a result, borrowers and lenders will be more committed 
to the terms of loan contracts, thus lowering the incidence of bad loans. Regulatory quality 
ensures that the government formulates policies and regulations that lower information 
asymmetry and transaction costs have the effect of reducing hidden actions by lenders and 
borrowers. This decreases the probability of loan default. Control of corruption is associated 
with pervasive self-interested behaviour and low levels of honesty, which increase the 
proportion of ‘lemons’ in the clientele of the MFIs. This drives up the proportion of bad loans 
in the loan portfolio. A negative relationship between control of corruption and credit risk is 
expected. 
3.2.2 Empirical Literature 
Empirical literature on credit risk in microfinance is scarce but much work has been done using 
bank-level data. This section reviews microfinance-level studies by comparing their findings 
to selected bank-level evidence. Studies on drivers of credit risk in microfinance institutions 
are emerging but are still inconclusive. Most of these studies have focused on credit risk, on 
one hand, and factors such as group lending methodology (Crabb and Keller, 2006), resilience 
of microfinance to macroeconomic shocks (Gonzalez, 2007), the gender factor (Schmit and 
Marrez, 2010; D’espallier et al., 2011), loan size (Chikalipah, 2018) and loan growth 
(Gonzalez, 2010), on the other hand. Few studies have focused on the determinants of 
microfinance credit risk (Sainz-Fernandez et al., 2015; Lassoued, 2017). 
Group lending schemes have been advocated in microfinance for several reasons. According 
to Khoi et al. (2013) and Ledgerwood (1999), the application of joint liability provides the peer 
pressure and social sanctions that act as substitutes for legal enforcement but are effective in 
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enhancing loan repayment and monitoring. Groups also provide an environment for 
information sharing, which necessarily lowers the “lemons problem” in lending. To test these 
conjectures, Crabb and Keller (2006) use a large international panel data set of 37 MFIs in 
Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America during 2001-2003 to compare credit risk 
exposure associated with group-based and individual microloans. They show that risk exposure 
of MFIs is lower when lending is group-based compared to individual-based lending.  
Compared to women, men have better access to financial markets because of their ownership 
of collateralizable assets like land and houses (Mpuga, 2010). This is the outcome of social 
constructs and norms which tend to confine women in farm and household activities while men 
engage in income-generating activities. This unequal access to credit markets forms the 
motivation of seeking to understand gender differences in the riskiness of microcredit 
(D’espallier et al., 2011; Schmit and Marrez, 2010). It is also the same motivation that has been 
used by MFIs to focus on women not only because of their relatively high poverty (Ledgewood, 
1999) but also because they are less likely to divert business cash to non-productive uses and 
they are more likely to prioritize their children’s welfare (Kaufman and Riggins, 2010). Using 
a global dataset of 350 MFIs in 70 countries between 1998 – 2008, D’espallier et al. (2011) test 
the hypothesis that women are better credit risks compared to men. Evidence shows that 
lending to women is negatively and significantly correlated with portfolio at risk, loan write-
offs and provisions for doubtful debts. Schmit and Marrez (2010) apply a non-parametric 
bootstrapping technique to compute probability density functions and value-at-risk in 
1,144,770 contracts issued at a Maghrebian MFI between 1997 and 2007, which reveal 
significant male-female similarities and differences in credit risk.   
Following overwhelming evidence in the banking industry of the exposure of banks to financial 
crises, Gonzalez (2007) attempts to establish the resilience of microfinance to macroeconomic 
shocks. The study investigates the correlation between GNI per capita and different measures 
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of credit risk (portfolio at risk over 30 days, portfolio at risk over 90 days, loan loss rate and 
write-off ratio) while controlling for other macroeconomic and country-level credit risk 
predictors. Consistent with Kraus and Walter (2009), the results of Gonzalez (2007) do not 
suggest any significant exposure of microfinance markets to macroeconomic shocks. This 
result seems to conflict with bank-level evidence adduced by Salas and Saurina (2002), Louzis 
et al. (2012), Ashgar and Daly (2010), Vasquez et al. (2012), Das and Ghosh (2007), Castro 
(2013), Festic et al. (2011), Fofack (2005), Mpofu and Nikolaidou (2018) and many others. 
These studies are premised on the fact that a recession is associated with lower GDP growth, 
which lowers the ability of individual and corporate borrowers to service debt and tends to lead 
to an increase in bad loans. Similarly, a recession is associated with low incomes and low 
demand for credit. Therefore, credit is extended to low-quality debtors, leading to higher 
probability of default (Chaibi and Ftiti, 2014). 
Predictions of agency theory suggest a positive association between rapid spikes in lending and 
stability risks. Gonzalez (2007; 2011) and Yimga (2016) fail to confirm this relationship by 
establishing negative and statistically significant relationships between loan growth and credit 
risk among MFIs. However, evidence from the banking sector tends to support the predictions 
of agency theory (Foos et al., 2010; Salas and Saurina, 2002; Das and Ghosh, 2007; Boutriga 
et al., 2010; Castro, 2013; Festic et al., 2011 and Kauko, 2012). Despite overwhelming evidence 
of a positive relationship between bank loan growth and credit quality, Clair (1992) finds that 
loan growth improves credit quality but lowers it after a lag. Generally, these findings show 
that rapid expansion in credit should not necessarily be associated with deteriorating financial 
stability but may also be seen as an indicator of deepening financial markets.  
It has been hypothesized that giving out small-sized loans significantly affects the likelihood 
of a crisis in an MFI (Sainz-Fernandez et al., 2015). Chikalipah (2018) pursues this relationship 
among 632 MFI drawn from 37 countries in SSA. The results suggest that lending to the poor 
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who take smaller loans is less risky compared to the non-poor who access relatively larger 
loans. Although the study by Chikalipah (2018) is closely related to the current study since it 
provides evidence on SSA, it is faced with the following shortfalls. First, it examines only 
micro-level predictors of credit risk but fails to account for the macro-institutional environment 
despite the fact that earlier studies (Ahlin et al., 2017) and theory (North, 1990; McMullen et 
al., 2008) have demonstrated the significant role played by these factors in determining 
microfinance outcomes. Secondly, the study accounts for dynamics but fails to control for time-
specific heterogeneity. The use of panel data (which is the basis of most past studies) exposes 
the findings to both cross-sectional and time-specific heterogeneity, which should be 
appropriately accounted for during modelling. Apart from Sainz-Fernandez et al. (2015) who 
controlled for both, the rest of these studies do not explicitly control for time-specific 
heterogeneity in their panel studies thereby introducing some heterogeneity biases. 
Studies by Crabb and Keller (2006), Gonzalez (2007; 2010), Schmit and Marrez (2010), 
D’espallier et al. (2011) and Chikalipah (2018) have pioneered the understanding of non-
performing loans in microfinance. However, they face weaknesses that are attributable to their 
failure to comprehensively analyse the determinants of credit risk in microfinance. Although 
they used panel data, the studies failed to account for dynamic factors yet the nature of panel 
data (combining cross-section and time series) requires the relationships to be modelled as 
autoregressive processes where past values of a variable affect the current values of that 
variable. The only exception in this case is Chikalipah (2018) who captures lagged effects of 
the dependent variable and focuses on SSA. The remaining studies do not provide any evidence 
on SSA, which has been shown to have relatively higher credit risk levels than other regions.  
Recent attempts to comprehensively analyse credit risk predictors in MFIs include Sainz-
Fernandez et al. (2015), Yimga (2016), Lassoued (2017) and Noomen and Abbes (2018). Some 
of the significant drivers of credit risk in MFIs found by Sainz-Fernandez et al. (2015) include 
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excessive liquidity, deposit-asset ratio, loan-employee ratio, profitability, GDP, political 
stability and private credit bureau. Lassoued (2017) finds that group lending, share of loans 
advanced to women, income diversification, private and public bureaus and low enforcement 
costs significantly influence credit risk. 
Noomen and Abbes (2018) provide evidence on a unique segment of microfinance – Islamic 
MFIs. The study confirms that credit risk among these MFIs is influenced by the number of 
active borrowers, loan loss provision, the return on gross loan portfolio, risk coverage, return 
on assets, inflation, the size and age of MFIs. Studies on Islamic finance are premised on the 
fact that unlike traditional banking, Islamic finance is unique in terms of cost efficiency (Samad 
and Hassan1999), default rates (Baele et al., 2010; Abedifar et al., 2013), insolvency risk 
(Cihak and Hesse, 2010) and market power14. This is attributed to principles governing 
financial transactions in Islamic banks, which forbid the payment or receipt of interest and the 
use of many derivative products (Abedifar et al. 2013). However, other studies have established 
no significant difference between traditional banks and Islamic banks in terms of production 
technology (El-Gamal and Inanoglu, 2005), cost and profit efficiency (Majid and Rais, 2003; 
Mohamad et al., 2008; Bader et al., 2008).  
The main weakness of the studies by Sainz-Fernandez et al. (2015), Lassoued (2017) and 
Noomen and Abbes (2018) is that they ignore credit risk dynamics and fail to provide any 
specific evidence on SSA. Yimga (2016) accounts for credit risk dynamics but fails to control 
for institutional factors and does not provide any evidence on SSA. Chikalipah (2018) estimates 
the relationship between loan sizes and credit risk in SSA but fails to account for the macro-
institutional environment despite the fact that earlier studies (Ahlin et al., 2017) and theory 
(North, 1990; McMullen et al., 2008) have demonstrated the significant role played by these 
                                                          
14 Abedifar et al. (2013). 
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factors in determining the performance of microfinance. Apart from Yimga (2016) and 
Chikalipah (2018), previous studies did not account for the dynamic effects of credit risk, yet 
time series econometrics requires economic relationships to be modelled as autoregressive 
processes where past values of a variable affect the current values of that variable. They apply 
mainly random effects or fixed effects estimators, which may be limited to deal with 
endogeneity issues in the data. Again, it should be noted that panel data (which is the basis of 
most past studies) is affected by both cross-sectional and time-specific heterogeneity, which 
should be appropriately accounted for during modelling. Apart from Sainz-Fernandez et al. 
(2015) who controlled for both, the rest of these studies do not explicitly control for time-
specific heterogeneity in their panel studies. 
Some of the bank-level macroeconomic factors that have been included in credit risk 
regressions include CPI, GDP, current account, gross fixed capital formation, consumption, 
FDI, trade balance, unemployment, external debt, money supply, interest rate and stock market 
index. Bank specific factors include total loans, leverage ratio, liquidity and interest on loans. 
However, a few studies have also incorporated institutional factors in their models. For 
instance, Breuer (2006) includes legal institutions (e.g. lack of property rights, law and order, 
legal origin), social institutions (e.g. ethnicity, corruption, income equality), political 
institutions (e.g. voice, government stability) and banking institutions (bank industry 
concentration, government ownership of banks, restricted activity in securities market, 
guidelines for asset diversification).   
 
Generally, the following gaps in knowledge have been identified. Analyses of credit risk 
determinants in finance are few and evidence is only emerging. Past MFI level analyses did not 
go beyond global results to make international comparisons at the regional levels. Only few of 
the previous studies controlled for the dynamics of credit risk. This study contributes to the 
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microfinance literature by not only documenting determinants of credit risk in SSA but also 
predictors of credit risk in SA, LAC, EECA and EAP. The study uses a two-way error 
components model and employs dynamic system GMM estimators which have been 
recommended for dealing with endogeneity problems (Roodman, 2009). In addition, the study 
tests the effect of non-linearities in the relationship between credit risk and loan growth, which 
has not been analysed in previous micro-finance literature except by Gonzalez (2010). 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Model Specification 
Since the objective of this study is to determine dynamic effects as well as to identify the 
determinants of credit risk, the model employed follows Foos et al. (2010), Salas and Saurina 
(2002), Louzis et al (2012), Das and Gosh (2007) and Castro (2013) to specify a one-way error 
components model.  
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑴𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝑿𝑡
′ 𝜌 + 𝜇𝑖+𝑣𝑖𝑡  (5) 
The dependent variable 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is credit risk. Vector M contains micro-level variables, which 
include loan growth, provision for loan impairment, capital asset ratio and return on equity. 
The macro-institutional variables, which are contained in vector X, capture country-level 
macroeconomic and institutional factors. These factors include GDP growth, inflation, private 
credit, political stability and the ease of getting credit. 𝜇𝑖 captures MFI-specific heterogeneity 
while 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Panel data is characterised by several heterogeneities. For instance, the data used for this study 
is exposed to MFI-specific heterogeneity as well as time-specific heterogeneity. In view of this, 
equation (5) can be modified by incorporating a variable that captures time-specific effects 
(𝛾𝑡). As such, the equation becomes: 
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𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑴𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜃 + 𝑿𝑡
′ 𝜌 + 𝜇𝑖+𝛾𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  (6) 
Applying ordinary least squares estimators to equation (6) results in the following econometric 
problems. First, there is reverse causality between credit growth and risk. Therefore, credit 
growth is endogenous because of this reverse causality. This problem leads to biased estimates 
because credit growth will be correlated with the error term. Second, time-invariant MFI-
specific effects will be correlated with other explanatory variables. Third, the presence of a 
lagged variable (𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1) gives rise to autocorrelation.  
Although fixed effects instrumental variable estimators can be applied to deal with the first and 
second problems, they will not be able to deal with the autocorrelation problem. This issue can 
be resolved by using a GMM approach. This study adopts the two-step system GMM estimator 
devised by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) because it is more precise 
especially when using finite samples. The estimator is based on a system comprising a first 
differenced model and a levels equation. The first differenced equation uses lagged level 
variables as instruments whereas the levels equation uses lagged first differences as 
instruments.    
3.3.2 Data Type and Sources 
The data that is used in this study is drawn from an MFI-level database, which is compiled by 
the Microfinance Information eXchange, Inc (or the MIX database). The MIX data was merged 
with country-level data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank) spanning 2000-
2014, Doing Business Indicators (World Bank) spanning 2004-2014 and World Governance 
Indicators (World Bank) spanning 2000-2014. The MIX database runs from 1996 to 2014 and 
contains about 16,634 observations with 23% coming from SSA, 16% from SA, 27% from 
LAC, 18% from EECA, 12% from EAP and 4% from MENA. Notably, the MIX database is 
unbalanced in that the number of MFIs covered and the number of observations fluctuates from 
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year to year. In 1996, there were 30 MFIs in the global database. This number rises to 1,199 in 
2005, 1,589 in 2011 and 958 in 2014. Globally, the median number of MFIs in the sample over 
2006-2014 is 958. The data covers 121 countries. It is estimated that 37 MFIs are from SSA, 
16 are from EAP, 24 are from EECA, 26 are from LAC, 10 are from MENA and seven are 
from SA.     
 
3.3.3 Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Credit risk is the sum of portfolio at risk and write-off ratio (Wagner and Winkler, 2013; 
Gonzalez, 2010; Sinkey and Greenwalt, 1991). Portfolio at risk refers to the ratio between loans 
that are overdue by more than 30 days and total loans. Write-off ratio is the portion of loan 
portfolio that has been declared unrecoverable and therefore posted as a loss (D’espallier et al., 
2011).  
Provision for loan impairment is the provision for loan losses as a percentage of total assets. 
MFIs account for customers’ loan defaults by keeping reserve accounts against which such 
losses are charged (Foos et al., 2010; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008; Noomen and Abbas, 2018). 
Therefore, it is expected that provision for loan impairment will be negatively associated with 
credit risk.  
Loan growth is the log difference in year-end gross loan portfolio. It is used as a proxy for 
excessive risk-taking (Gonzalez, 2007; 2010; Laidroo and Mannassoo, 2014; Vithessonthi, 
2016). Overall, the effect of loan growth on credit risk is ambiguous depending on whether 
loan growth is triggered by supply or demand shifts (Keeton, 1999). 
Capital asset ratio is the share of equity capital in total assets of the MFI. Agency theory 
stipulates that well capitalised MFIs will tend to be more conservative in lending because this 
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lowers their risk exposure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002). It is expected that the capital-asset ratio will be negatively correlated with 
credit risk.     
Return on equity measures the earnings after taxes divided by total equity. According to Chaibi 
and Ftiti (2015), Love and Ariss (2014), Abid et al. (2013) and Vithessonthi (2016), it is a 
proxy for management quality. Higher profitability indicates better management quality but it 
could also signal the existence of soft budget constraints and excess cash flows leading to 
careless lending behaviour by MFIs. There is an ambiguous relationship between profitability 
and credit risk. 
GDP per capita growth is the percentage growth in real GDP per capita. Measured as the 
annual % change in real GDP per capita, it is included to capture business cycle effects. It is 
expected that there is procyclicality between GDP per capita growth and loan growth 
(Hofmann, 2004). 
Private credit refers to the domestic credit given to the private sector by banks as a share of 
GDP. It is an indicator of financial sector development and can also be used as a measure of 
indebtedness of firms and households (Pesolla, 2011; Castro, 2013). Therefore, the relationship 
between private credit and credit risk is ambiguous. 
Inflation is the annual percentage change in the consumer price index. High inflation is usually 
a source of macroeconomic risk and uncertainty. The effect of inflation on credit risk is 
ambiguous. The negative effect works through two channels. The first channel is based on the 
Phillips curve hypothesis, which postulates a trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
(Mishkin, 2013). The second channel works through the effect of inflation on the real value of 
the loan. The real value of the loan tends to fall when inflation is high thus reducing the 
probability of default.  
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Political stability measures the likelihood of political unrest or politically-motivated violence 
(Indicators, 2015). The variable is a perception index ranging from -2.5 (weak performance) to 
2.5 (strong performance) as reported in the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank.  
 
Ease of getting credit measures “the legal rights of borrowers and lenders with respect to 
secured transactions and the reporting of credit information” (Business, 2017). It is measured 
in terms of distance to the frontier on a scale from 0 to 100. The maximum value of 100 is the 
frontier or best practice. This measure captures the gap between an economy’s performance 
and the best practice value among the entire sample. The variable is drawn from the World 
Bank’s Doing Business Indicators database. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Mean credit risk was 12% in SSA over the 2004-2014 period15. Results in Appendix Table A7 
indicate that most of the variables are not normally distributed since their skewness and kurtosis 
values are at variance with the conventional skewness of 0 and kurtosis of 3 for a normal 
distribution. The skewness and kurtosis values for credit risk are 4.99 and 45.24 respectively, 
implying that the distribution is positively skewed with very thin tails. That means the error 
term in equation (6) is also likely to be non-normal. This problem is exacerbated by the 
presence of outliers in the database. To deal with this problem, the data was truncated at the 
5% percentile in the upper and lower tails of the distribution. Similarly, GMM estimators were 
                                                          
15 It is important to note that the median credit risk is significantly higher in SSA (7.1%) compared to non-SSA 
(4.5%). Huge differences between the SSA mean and median is because of the presence of outliers, which have 
a bigger effect on the mean. 
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deployed to allow reliable estimation of the parameters when the distribution of the error term 
is not normal. 
Mean test results reported in Table 4 show that there are significant differences between loan 
growth, private credit, GDP per capita growth, inflation, political stability and the ease of 
getting credit in SSA and non-SSA. This gives enough reason to believe that MFIs in SSA 
operate under different macro-institutional conditions compared to MFIs elsewhere. For 
example, the share of credit by the banks to the private sector in GDP for SSA is 17.5% 
compared to 33.7% for non-SSA. This implies that MFIs in SSA operate in markets with very 
low financial depth compared to their counterparts elsewhere. Similarly, MFIs in SSA operate 
in an environment characterised by high macroeconomic uncertainty as measured by higher 
inflation levels (see Table 4). 
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Table 4: Comparisons of means – SSA and non-SSA 
 Non-SSA SSA difference t-ratio 
Credit risk (ratio) 0.31 0.12 0.192 (0.51) 
Loan growth (Ratio) 0.264 0.29 -0.026* (-2.14) 
Provision for loan impairment (ratio) 0.018 0.02 -0.002 (-1.85) 
Capital asset ratio 0.354 0.32 0.034 (1.32) 
Return on equity (ratio) 0.146 -0.09 0.236 (0.32) 
Private credit (%)  33.71 17.48 16.23*** (50.43) 
GDP per capita growth (%) 4.561 2.59 1.97*** (25.40) 
Inflation (%) 4.964 7.79 -2.83*** (-9.73) 
Political stability (index) -0.753 -0.54 -0.213*** (-14.92) 
Ease of getting credit (index) 43.62 33.11 10.5*** (24.04) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
3.4.2 Regression Results 
The correlation matrix reported in Appendix Table A8 indicates that there is low correlation 
among most of the variables. The only exception is the high correlation of 0.7 between loan 
growth and loan growth squared, which is expected.  
Before running the regressions, some of the variables are transformed. These include credit 
risk which is log-transformed and the governance indicators which are transformed by 
computing their percentage growth. After running the regressions, the results are checked for 
proper specification by conducting the Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first 
differenced errors, the F-test for joint significance of the coefficients as well as the Hansen test 
for overidentifying restrictions (H0 = overidentifying restrictions are valid). The Arellano-Bond 
test is designed to test for zero autocorrelation (H0 = no autocorrelation). Usually, AR (1) is 
expected to reject the null while AR (2) should fail to reject the null. The Arellano-Bond test 
reveals that all the regression results reported in sections 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2 passed the 
autocorrelation test for the first and second lag. The Hansen test confirms that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. 
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3.4.2.1  Determinants of Credit Risk in SSA 
Table 5 reports the regression results of the baseline model using the two-step system GMM 
estimator. For comparison purposes and in order to establish robustness, results for alternative 
specifications using fixed effects, random effects and OLS estimators are presented in 
Appendix Table A9. The results in Table 5 show that the main predictors of credit risk in SSA 
are lagged credit risk, loan growth, provision for loan impairment, GDP per capita growth and 
ease of getting credit. In addition, the study finds that the effect of loan growth on credit risk 
is non-linear and robust to different estimators. Credit risk falls with loan growth until a trough 
at 36.8% when this relationship is reversed. Therefore, this study confirms that loan growth 
becomes risky beyond 36.8%. Below a loan growth of this level, MFIs pursuing an aggressive 
lending policy face much less credit risk exposure. This result could be explained by either 
demand shifts or productivity shifts but not supply shifts (Keeton, 1999), in which case loan 
growth could be seen as an equilibrium convergence process (Kiss et al., 2006). This is 
consistent with Gonzalez (2007; 2010) and Yimga (2016) who find a significantly negative 
relationship between MFI loan growth and portfolio at risk. Clair (1992) also finds that bank 
loan growth improves loan quality. However, these past studies did not test for non-linearity in 
the relationship between credit risk and loan growth, which is found by the current study to be 
important. 
There is evidence that dynamics matter for credit risk. The first lag of credit risk is significantly 
positive with an elasticity of 0.22, which implies that there exists conditional convergence in 
credit risk (Fung, 2009; Asongu, 2013; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016). This result is robust 
to different specifications although the magnitudes vary by type of estimator. Ideally, this result 
can be interpreted in several ways. First, the result shows that an increase in lagged credit risk 
by 1% increases the current credit risk by 0.22%. Secondly, it means credit risk was higher 
among MFIs that were already facing high risk exposure. This result may reflect the fact that 
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MFI managers are backward-looking when it comes to credit risk assessment. They keep non-
performing loans in their books for longer periods of time.   
 
Table 5: Credit risk determinants in SSA: Baseline results 
 Credit risk 
Credit risk (L1) 0.22** 
 (0.097) 
Loan growth -0.89* 
 (0.459) 
Loan growth squared 1.21** 
 (0.556) 
Provision for loan impairment (in logs) 0.18*** 
 (0.042) 
Capital asset ratio 0.09 
 (0.251) 
Return on equity -0.06 
 (0.078) 
Private credit  -0.00 
 (0.005) 
GDP per capita growth -0.02* 
 (0.012) 
Inflation -0.00 
 (0.007) 
Political stability -0.02 
 (0.013) 
Ease of getting credit 0.62*** 
 (0.139) 
No of observations 394 
No of MFIs 149 
No of instruments 56 
F-stat 4.84 
AR (1) [p-value] 0.021 
AR (2) [p-value] 0.812 
Hansen [p-value] 0.165 
The dependent variable is credit risk (in logs). Endogenous variables are 
lagged credit risk, loan growth and loan growth squared; the rest of the 
variables are treated as exogenous. Two step system GMM estimator, 
robust standard errors (in parentheses), small-sample adjustments and 
orthogonal deviation were applied. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  Results for 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first differenced errors 
(H0=there is no autocorrelation) and F-test for joint significance of parameters are 
reported. Results of Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions (H0=overidentifying 
restrictions are valid) are also reported. (L1) indicates the first lag. 
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Against expectations, provision for loan impairment positively and significantly predicts credit 
risk. When provision for loan impairment increases by one unit, credit risk increases by 18%. 
Higher provisions for loan defaults are made when risk exposure is high. This result is 
consistent with Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) and Boudriga et al. (2010) who found that the 
relationship between non-performing loans and provisioning for doubtful loans in banks was 
significantly positive. However, in terms of prudential regulation, this result is worrying 
because regulators usually encourage loan loss provisioning in order to lower risk exposure.   
There is evidence that business cycles significantly affect loan defaults in MFIs. Credit risk 
falls by 2% for each percentage point increase in GDP per capita growth. This is explained by 
the fact that GDP growth per capita growth is associated with optimistic customer expectations, 
which spurs borrowing by economic agents (firms and households). The agents increase their 
indebtedness because of the improvement in their loan servicing capacity during an economic 
expansion. However, this result is inconsistent with Ahlin et al., (2011) who found that GDP 
growth had no significant effect on portfolio at risk.  
As expected, the ease of getting credit is significantly associated with higher credit risk. Credit 
risk increases by 62% for each unit increase in the ease of getting credit. When there is easy 
credit, financial exposure to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection is increased with 
the result that the portfolio of non-performing loans goes up. Easy credit may mean aggressive 
lending by MFIs is driven by supply shifts rather than demand or productivity shifts (Keeton, 
1999), which results in a disequilibrium (excess supply of loans) and high indebtedness. These 
conditions result in a high probability of default.  
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3.4.2.2  A Comparative Analysis of Credit Risk Determinants 
In this section, baseline regression results for SSA are compared to regression results for four 
regions (EAP, EECA, LAC, SA) and two groupings (non-SSA and World). Table 6 reproduces 
the results for SSA and juxtaposes them against results for EAP, EECA, LAC, SA, non-SSA 
and the World.  
Table 6 shows that the coefficients on lagged credit risk are positive and statistically significant 
in all regressions, implying that dynamics matter for credit risk in MFIs. However, credit risk 
is most persistent in EAP where a permanent increase in lagged credit risk by 1% increases the 
expected value of current credit risk by 0.43%. Credit risk is least persistent in SSA where a 
1% rise in lagged credit risk is associated with a 0.22% increase in current credit risk. In SA, 
LAC and EECA, 1% increase in lagged credit risk is, respectively, significantly correlated to 
0.4%. 0.33% and 0.32% rise in current credit risk.   
The following additional observations can be made from Table 6. Firstly, loan growth has a 
non-linear relationship with credit risk in SSA, EAP and LAC but not in EECA and SA. The 
turning points in SSA, EAP and LAC are 36.7%, 363% and 108%, respectively. This implies 
that MFIs in SSA reach their turning point faster than those in EAP and LAC. This result 
confirms the argument that fast loan growth rates that were experienced in SSA during 2000-
2007 averaging 39.9% were responsible for the financial instability that was witnessed in the 
sector in subsequent years (Riquet and Poursat, 2013; Boateng et al., 2006). However, it is 
probable that the crises that were experienced in other regions may have had little linkages with 
fast loan growth.  
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Table 6: Credit risk determinants – SSA vs non-SSA 
 Dependent variable: credit risk (in logs) 
 SSA EAP EECA LAC SA Non-SSA World 
Credit risk (L1) 0.22** 0.49*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.40*** 0.34*** 0.47** 
 (0.097) (0.085) (0.094) (0.065) (0.060) (0.067) (0.189) 
Loan growth -0.89* -0.80*** -1.48*** -1.17*** -0.65*** -0.50*** -2.15*** 
 (0.459) (0.259) (0.489) (0.342) (0.131) (0.170) (0.419) 
Loan growth squared 1.21** 0.11*** 0.45 0.54** -0.27** 0.06** 0.30*** 
 (0.556) (0.034) (0.415) (0.249) (0.117) (0.027) (0.068) 
Provision for loan impairment 
(in logs) 
0.18*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.21*** 
 (0.042) (0.057) (0.055) (0.024) (0.037) (0.026) (0.048) 
Capital asset ratio 0.09 -0.27* -0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 
 (0.251) (0.160) (0.220) (0.080) (0.151) (0.074) (0.089) 
Return on equity -0.06 -0.09 -0.35 -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.02** -0.01*** 
 (0.078) (0.112) (0.267) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Private credit  -0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.00 -0.02*** -0.00 -0.00* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
GDP per capita growth -0.02* -0.03 -0.02** -0.01** 0.02 -0.02*** -0.00 
 (0.012) (0.042) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) 
Inflation -0.00 0.07*** -0.01 -0.00 0.02** -0.01*** -0.00 
 (0.007) (0.023) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) 
Political stability -0.02 0.29 0.04*** 0.01 -0.09 0.03*** 0.01 
 (0.013) (0.220) (0.012) (0.014) (0.343) (0.010) (0.014) 
Ease of getting credit 0.62*** -0.86* 0.01 0.22*** 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.139) (0.438) (0.138) (0.081) (0.048) (0.058) (0.065) 
No of observations 394 329 408 1,305 715 2,853 3,257 
No of MFIs 149 118 110 294 217 763 913 
No of instruments 73 89 73 57 89 105 69 
F-Stat 123.6 151.6 342 856.5 227.2 32.8 40.1 
AR (1) [p-value] 0,031 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) [p-value] 0.920 0.867 0.940 0.728 0.748 0.493 0.115 
Hansen (p-value) 0.128 0.113 0.225 0.533 0.15 0.106 0.530 
The dependent variable is credit risk (in logs). Endogenous variables are lagged credit risk, loan growth and 
loan growth squared; the rest of the variables are treated as exogenous. Two step system GMM estimators, 
robust standard errors (in parentheses), small-sample adjustments and orthogonal deviation were applied. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  Results for Arellano-Bond 
test for zero autocorrelation in first differenced errors (H0=there is no autocorrelation) and F-test for joint 
significance of parameters are reported. Results of Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions 
(H0=overidentifying restrictions are valid) are also reported. (L1) indicates the first lag. All regressions include 
time and type dummies. A constant is included in the regressions but not reported. Results for MENA are 
excluded due to few observations. 
 
The second observation is that provision for loan impairment is robust and significantly 
correlated with credit risk in all regions. However, the magnitude of this effect varies across 
regions. This implies that MFIs do not generally use provision for loan losses as a mechanism 
to cushion them against potential loan losses. If this were the case, the sign on the coefficient 
on provision for loan impairment would be reversed. 
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Third, the results show that the macroeconomic environment is important in explaining credit 
risk in all regions. Growth in GDP per capita is associated with lower credit risk in SSA, EECA 
and LAC while inflation increases credit risk in EAP and SA. Domestic credit to the private 
sector reduces credit risk in EAP and SA. These findings suggest that GDP per capita growth 
in SSA, EECA and LAC is associated with increased capacity to service debt and lower demand 
for credit resulting in low probability of loan defaults. However, increasing domestic credit to 
the private sector leads to lower credit risk because of lower informational constraints (absence, 
uncertainty and asymmetry) that accompany deepening of the financial sector in EAP and SA. 
Inflation is found to positively and significantly influence credit risk in EAP and SA because 
an increase the consumer price level is an indicator of macroeconomic uncertainty. When 
inflation is high, the plans are usually disrupted and actions of borrowers cannot be known in 
advance. When this is the case, exposure to information asymmetry goes up.   
Finally, institutional factors significantly affect the level of credit risk. Whereas the ease of 
getting credit is a predictor of credit risk in SSA, EAP and LAC, political stability significantly 
affects the level of risk in EECA. Notably, the coefficients on ease of getting credit in SSA and 
LAC are positive and significant while the coefficient on the same variable in EAP is negative 
and significant. Therefore, the ease of getting credit in SSA and LAC seems to be accompanied 
by informational problems of moral hazard and adverse selection whereas in EAP, ease of 
getting credit may be accompanied by more effective screening of loan applicants, monitoring 
the loans and assessing the collateral. 
The coefficient on political stability is positive and statistically significant in EECA. This result 
can be attributed to the certainty in decision making which happens when rules and regulations 
can be predicted in advance. This may push potential entrepreneurs out of the formal economy 
into the informal economy. Increased entry into microenterprise spurs the demand for micro 
loans, which leads to accumulation of non-performing loans.     
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3.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The purpose of this study is to identify determinants of credit risk in SSA MFIs and to establish 
whether these determinants have the same effects on credit risk in other regions of the world. 
To investigate these conditions, GMM estimators were applied in regression models for SSA 
as well as SA, LAC, EECA and ECA. Data from four different databases (MIX market, World 
Development Indicators, World Governance Indicators and the Doing Business Indicators) was 
used in the regressions. The findings suggest that the main predictors of credit risk in SSA are 
lagged credit risk, loan growth, provision for loan impairment, growth in GDP per capita and 
ease of getting credit. In addition, the study finds that the effect of loan growth on credit risk 
is non-linear; credit risk falls with loan growth until a trough at 36.8% when this relationship 
is reversed. At the global level, credit risk is determined by lagged credit risk, loan growth, 
provision for loan impairment, return on equity and credit to the private sector by banks.   
Although lagged credit risk, loan growth and provision for loan impairment significantly affect 
credit risk in all regions, it is found that the drivers of credit risk in SSA are not necessarily the 
same factors that drive credit risk in other regions. For instance, GDP per capita growth 
significantly affects credit risk in SSA, EECA and LAC whereas inflation has a notable impact 
on credit risk in EAP and SA.   
In terms of policy, regulators of MFIs should be concerned that loan loss provisioning is 
positively and significantly associated with credit risk. Regulators usually recommend loan 
loss provisioning as a measure to lower credit risk exposure. However, the results suggest that 
this prudential tool may not be achieving the desired results. There is need to explore further 
the effect of loan loss provisioning in regulated MFIs.  
Since the effect of loan growth is non-linear, MFIs should be encouraged to enhance their 
outreach but keep an eye on the quality of their credit. They should be able to determine the 
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turning point of their outreach activities so that they know at what level their lending becomes 
risky. The results also suggest that credit risk scoring, which is the dominant approach that 
MFIs apply in loan screening, should consider past levels of risk as this is a predictor of future 
credit risk outcomes.  
MFIs should be encouraged to hire qualified personnel because this tends to improve 
profitability. Since loan growth is negatively related to credit risk, MFIs should be encouraged 
to continue to improve the quality of their loan portfolio through devoting enough resources 
for credit administration and loan monitoring. This approach not only strengthens credit 
underwriting standards, it also diversifies their loan portfolio along sectors and regions.  
Similarly, government agencies, Central Banks and ministries of finance, that manage growth 
policy should prudently manage the reforms that enhance the earning capacity of firms and 
households. They should provide incentives for entrepreneurship, savings and capital. Higher 
incomes in the economy are associated with lower credit risk. Similarly, institutional reforms 
that enhance access to credit are good for income generation and the growth of small 
businesses, although this may enhance credit risk exposure. The role of credit bureaus and other 
interventions that lower information asymmetry should be encouraged. Moreover, these 
findings suggest that MFIs in reforming countries need to develop new customer-focused 
approaches of increasing lending such that the institutional reforms do not have a negative 
impact on the quality of their loan portfolio.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Factors Influencing Households’ Access to MFI Credit in Kenya 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Understanding why many people, especially the poor, remain excluded from credit markets 
remains a global scholarly and policy concern. In response, a large body of literature has grown 
over the years seeking to explain why access to credit differs so much across households, 
individuals and even countries. Extant literature has brought to the fore some key insights, 
which have had a bearing on knowledge and policy.  
 
Firstly, it has been established that both individual characteristics (such as age, gender, 
education, employment status, income and so on) and household characteristics (such as family 
size, consumption, assets, poverty status, etc.) are significantly associated with the use of credit 
(Mohieldin and Wright, 2000; Okurut, 2006; Manrique and Ojah, 2004; Zeller, 1994). These 
findings have been used to prescribe welfare policies that enhance the human capital 
endowment and productivity of individuals and households as a way of making them 
creditworthy (Okurut et al., 2005). Secondly, it is evident that in some cases formal and 
informal sectors are symbiotic rather than dualistic (Khoi et al., 2013; Mohieldin and Wright, 
2000; Kochar, 1997). These findings have an implication that the informal sector needs to be 
harnessed, rather than eliminated as was earlier emphasized by market failure proponents of 
public policy. In fact, it may hold the promise for the efficient functioning of the formal sector. 
Thirdly, institutional factors such as race, ethnicity, trust, property rights, as well as law and 
order determine outcomes in the credit markets (Okurut, 2006; Khoi et al., 2013; Farazi, 2014; 
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Turvey and Kong, 2010; Crook, 2001; Akoten et al., 2006). Given that the effect of institutional 
factors has a long gestation period, lowering institutional barriers may require systematic and 
gradual measures.  Since households are often exposed to shocks, the fourth element to 
consider is the fact that credit has been used for consumption-smoothing, and to cushion 
households from shocks, rather than for investment (Bending et al., 2009; Zeller, 1994; Diagne, 
1999). These findings highlight the understanding that the demand for credit extends beyond 
meeting investment demands, and points to other social demands that may require new credit 
scoring approaches.    
 
With a lack of data on mobile financial services (MFS)16 since such technologies are relatively 
new in many countries, relatively few scholarly works have analysed the impact of mobile 
financial services on access to credit. But Kenya’s dynamic market for MFS is almost mature; 
there is heightened scholarly interest in this area and data is becoming available. Therefore, the 
current study attempts to fill this gap in knowledge by providing evidence on the impact of M-
banking, M-money and M-credit on the access to MFI credit in Kenya. MFS can be used to 
explain why access to credit differs across individuals and households. This is justified by 
transaction cost and distance theories (Weber et al., 2012). Unlike traditional credit, M-credit 
platforms are fast, automated and remote, which allows them to dismantle the collateral, 
distance and transaction cost barriers (Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Kaufman and Riggins, 2010). 
 
                                                          
16 In this study, mobile financial services refer to M-money, M-banking and M-credit. M-Money allows users to 
exchange cash for an “e-float” on their phones, to send e-float to other cellular phone users and to exchange e-
float back to cash (Mbiti and Weil, 2011). M-banking refers to the provision of banking services (checking account 
balances, transfer funds, obtain customised information, pay for goods and services and so on) with the help of a 
mobile phone (Donner and Tellez, 2008). M-credit was launched in Kenya in 2012 but there are currently 20 
digital credit providers. The M-credit platform executes loan application, credit scoring, approval and 
disbursement remotely without the need to physically visit the credit granting organization. 
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The current study applies a discrete choice framework using 2013 (N=6449) and 2015 
(N=8665) household data. The data was collected under the Financial Access Partnership 
comprising the Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and Financial 
Sector Deepening Trust. Due to the fact that access to credit and income are jointly determined, 
the study employed instrumental variable estimators to forestall endogeneity concerns. Tests 
for validity of the instruments and endogeneity of income justified the use of IV Probit and IV 
2SLS. The results show that the factors influencing the probability of using MFI credit in 
Kenya are not similar over the two periods analysed (2013 and 2015). There are also variations 
in the results when analysed by poverty status. In 2013, the predictors of the propensity to use 
MFI credit are income, gender and type of cluster. M-money plays a complementary role in 
accessing MFI credit among the non-poor. In 2015, those using M-banking and M-credit are 
less likely to use MFI credit. In addition, young, male, married, uneducated and urban-based 
demographics as well as people with lower incomes and residents of small-sized households 
are less likely to use MFI credit.  Two general findings stand out. First: increasing log income 
by one unit increases the probability of using MFI credit by 23%. This finding implies that 
MFIs are lending more to the non-poor, which is not their target group. Therefore, borrowing 
by the non-poor from MFIs is dislodging the poor from accessing MFI credit. The second 
finding is that M-banking and M-credit are significantly and negatively associated with the 
probability to use MFI credit, indicating that these mobile-based services are drawing users 
away from MFI credit. This goes against the expectation that these financial innovations aim 
to bank the poor.  
 
The investigation of MFS impact on the microfinance sector continues as follows. Section 4.2 
discusses the layering of the credit market in Kenya. Section 4.3 reviews the literature, 
identifying the aspects of microfinance credit and MFS requiring more scholarly attention. 
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Section 4.4 provides the methodology employed in this study while Section 4.5 reports the 
regression results and discusses the findings. Finally, the paper provides some policy 
recommendations in Section 4.6.  
 
4.2 Structure of the Credit Market in Kenya 
 
Households and firms in Kenya obtain their credit from formal, semi-formal and informal 
sources. The formal sector consists of private and public banks. In 2015, there were 43 
commercial banks and nine microfinance banks operating in the country – all licensed, 
regulated and supervised by the Central Bank of Kenya. The main objective of commercial 
banks is to generate profit by providing relatively large individual and enterprise loans as well 
as by mobilizing savings from the public. Private banks are mainly concentrated in urban 
centres but public banks have extended their services beyond urban areas into rural areas. For 
political and economic reasons, public banks have been used by the government to achieve 
public policy goals. For example, they are often used to channel credit to strategic sectors such 
as agriculture, the youth, women and university students among others. Like many commercial 
banks elsewhere, access to banks in Kenya is limited by (a) minimum balance requirements to 
open an account; (b) collateral requirements; and (c) bureaucratic processes. In 2007, only 4% 
of the Kenyan population had accessed a bank loan (GOK, 2007). This proportion had grown 
to 6.5% and 7.3% in 2013 and 2015, respectively (see Table 7). This shows that bank 
penetration has been increasing although access has been relatively low among the poor – 
estimated at 2.7% in 2015 (see Table 7).  
  
 71 
 
 
Table 7: Sources of Credit in Kenya 
 2015 (%) 2013 (%) 
Source of loan Poor Non-poor All Poor Non-poor All 
N 3549 5116 8665 1958 4222 6190 
Bank 2.7 10.5 7.3 1.7 8.9 6.5 
MFI 4.8 15.6 15.5 3.8 12.8 9.8 
Government 1.0 3.2 2.3 0.5 1.5 1.2 
Employer 1.8 4.1 3.2 1.8 4.3 3.5 
ASCA 6.4 10.4 8.8 1.4 3.6 2.8 
Chama 5.8 7.1 6.5 6.3 10.4 8.9 
Family & friends 18.0 23.4 21.2 13.9 19.7 17.5 
Shylock 1.1 2.3 1.8 2.0 2.9 2.6 
Shopkeeper 14.1 8.7 10.9 10.3 14.7 12.9 
Buyer 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.8 3.9 3.2 
Mortgage 1.1 3.4 1.7 0.6 2.2 1.6 
Hire purchase 0.7 1.2 1.0 - - - 
Supplier 22.1 24.6 23.5 - - - 
Digital  2.9 15.2 10.1 - - - 
All 48.9 62.4 56.9 28.5 46.1 39.8 
Source: Computed by author using 2013 and 2015 FinAccess data. Banks consist of commercial banks, 
Postbank and microbanks. Government refers to Joint Loans scheme, Higher Education Loans Board, Youth 
Fund; MFI refers to microfinance institution and combines credit-only MFIs and SACCOs; ASCA refers to 
Accumulating Savings and Credit Association; Chama refers to self-help groups; shylock refers to informal 
money lender; digital credit refers to M-Shwari, Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) MPESA and others.     
 
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), Savings and Credit Co-operative Associations 
(SACCOs) and Government loan programmes (including Joint Loans Scheme, Higher 
Education Loans Board, Youth Fund, Women Fund and others) fall under the semi-formal 
strand. Unlike formal institutions, NGOs and SACCOs are not licensed and regulated by the 
Central Bank of Kenya. Instead, they are licensed and supervised by Sacco Societies 
Regulatory Authority and the NGO Co-ordination Board. SACCOs have a welfare focus with 
deposit mobilization as an overriding strategy while NGOs depend more on donor and 
government support, which comes via technical assistance and subsidies (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
Generally, semi-formal institutions integrate the features of both formal and informal sector 
players. Due to their poverty focus, NGOs in Kenya have been at the forefront of introducing 
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the group approach17, which is an internationally tested approach (Bendig et al., 2009).  In 
2015, Kenya had 3816 SACCOs and 21 credit-only MFIs. Although MFIs have a poverty 
focus, they seem to serve more non-poor people compared to the poor. This fact is evident in 
both 2013 and 2015 (see Table 7). In 2015, 4.8% of the poor received credit from MFIs 
compared to 15.6% of the non-poor. However, the importance of MFIs in Kenya’s credit 
market increased between 2013 (9.8%) and 2015 (15.5%). 
 
Credit-only NGOs can be traced to the establishment of Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme 
under USAID sponsorship in the 1980s (Johnson and Nino-Zarazua, 2009) as well as the 
establishment of Kenya Women Trust and Faulu Kenya. According to the Annual Report on 
the Microfinance Sector in Kenya, the total assets of the microfinance sector in 2013 amounted 
to about Ksh 315.7 billion, the loan portfolio was Ksh 63.1 billion and outreach of the sector 
was 808,399 persons (AMFI, 2014). The microfinance sector is dominated by microfinance 
banks (which hold 45% of the loan portfolio) and women (who constitute roughly 62% of the 
active borrowers).  
Proponents of the credit rationing school view the evolution of the informal lending sector as 
a consequence of failure in credit markets. Consistent with this view, the sector has been left 
to operate on the fringes of government regulation and supervision (Ledgerwood, 1999). 
Despite this exclusion, the informal credit sector in Kenya remains huge, resilient and growing. 
As shown in Table 7, the informal sector consists of employers, ASCAs, chamas (self-help 
groups), friends and relatives, shylocks, shopkeepers, buyers and suppliers. In 2013, out of all 
Kenyan adults who had borrowed money, about 48.2% of the credit was sourced from the 
informal sector. This proportion rose to 77.2% in 2015. Although not universal, in the majority 
                                                          
17 Solidarity or group lending is a lending approach mainly used in microfinance where small groups borrow based 
on social collateral (rather financial collateral) to lower default risk and where peer monitoring and social 
sanctions are used by members to lower moral hazard in lending (Armendariz and Murdoch, 2010).  
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of cases, loans in the informal sector are granted on the basis of social collateral while 
repayment is enforced through social sanctions.     
 
There are two significant structural changes in Kenya’s credit market (Table 7). First: access 
to credit increased from 39.8% in 2013 to 56.9% in 2015. This increase slightly favoured the 
poor, among whom access to credit rose by 20 percentage points relative to 16 percentage 
points among the non-poor. Secondly, there have been shifts in the importance of sources of 
credit. In 2015, the most important sources of credit were suppliers, family and friends, 
microfinance institutions, shopkeepers and M-credit. However, the most important sources of 
credit in 2013 are family and friends, shopkeepers, microfinance institutions, chamas and 
banks. These shifts are marginalizing formal and semi-formal credit but giving more 
importance to informal sources of credit. Paradoxically, the main focus of public policy in 
Kenya is to promote the formal and semi-formal sectors, with much less focus on the informal 
sector. This seems to be driven by the thinking that once the formal and semi-formal segments 
penetrate all demographics, the (undesirable) informal sector will automatically vanish.  
 
The latest innovation in the credit market in Kenya has been the introduction of an M-credit 
product called M-Shwari in 2012 through a partnership between Commercial Bank of Africa 
and Safaricom18. This product offers loans of between Ksh 100 and Ksh 20,000 at a 7.5% 
nominal interest rate repayable within 30 days. The launch of M-Shwari has spawned the 
introduction of another 20 digital credit platforms with diverse terms and conditions. For 
example, KCB MPESA grants loans between Ksh 50 and Ksh 1,000,000 at 14% annual interest 
rate which can be repaid within either 30, 90 or 180 days. Results of the FinAccess surveys 
                                                          
18 This paragraph draws heavily from several blogs at http://www.cgap.org (accessed on 17th October 2017) and 
FSD-Kenya (2015) 
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show that about 10.1% of adults in Kenya have accessed a digital loan or M-credit banking 
product (see Table 1). This proportion is higher than the share of those who had accessed a 
bank loan (7.3%) and a loan from government (2.3%). Digital credit is becoming popular 
because, unlike traditional bank credit, the process from loan application to approval can take 
a minimum of a few seconds and a maximum of 24 hours. The processes are fast, automated 
and remote with the potential to dismantle the traditional barriers of collateral, geography and 
infrastructure. Despite the growing importance of M-credit in Kenya, there is little knowledge 
on how it is affecting traditional forms of credit. The current study will provide new evidence 
on how M-credit affects access to MFI credit. 
 
4.3 Literature Review  
 
4.3.1 Theoretical Literature 
In theory, the credit market consists of the demand and the supply sides (Khoi et al., 2013; 
Diagne, 1999). Borrowers choose to participate in the formal credit market because they want 
to maximize their expected utility subject to certain constraints. The first step is choosing to 
participate in the credit market (Dutta and Magableh, 2006). However, choosing to participate 
in the credit market is not enough since the process from loan application to the granting of the 
loan is sequential, information-intensive and it involves different people at every stage. In the 
next step, the borrowers will determine how much they wish to borrow before they submit their 
application to the lender, who in turn decides whether to approve the loan or not. Finally, the 
lender determines the amount to be granted to the borrower. This chain of events illustrates the 
fact that whereas participation in the credit market is a demand side issue, access to the credit 
market is supply-driven because the lender decides to approve the loan on the basis of the 
borrower’s creditworthiness (Okurut et al., 2005; Zeller, 1994).    
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Given the absence, uncertainty and asymmetry of information (Jagun et al., 2008), allocation 
of resources in the credit market is therefore inefficient because the price of credit fails to 
equalize the supply and demand sides of the market to yield an equilibrium. In this case, 
equilibrium exists with an excess demand or credit rationing (Khoi et al., 2013). Quantity 
rationing is ideally a market failure which occurs when either the lender offers the borrower a 
loan amount that is less than the amount of loan demanded or completely rejects the loan 
application (Dutta and Magableh, 2006). Manrique and Ojah (2004) call this feature “a short 
supply of credit”. Loan contracts are not on the basis of willing buyer–willing seller (Okurut, 
2006) but are conditioned by non-price factors. Non-price factors are contingent on the amount 
of information the lender can access regarding the loan applicant, even though the loan 
applicant has an incentive to hide any undesirable behaviour that may jeopardize the approval 
of the loan. These information-related constraints (absence, uncertainty and asymmetry) 
impose market frictions, which include costs of monitoring, acquiring information and 
enforcing contracts (Cordella, 2006). These frictions prevent the lenders from being perfectly 
informed about the default risk associated with the loan applicant and the project being 
financed (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). These problems lead to excess demand in the formal 
financial market, which in turn gives room to the evolution of informal institutions (Okurut et 
al., 2005). Unlike their counterparts in the formal sector, informal lenders rely on relationship 
lending whereby group dynamics, joint liability, reputational capital, social collateral and 
repayment incentives are used to forestall problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in 
lending (Khoi et al., 2013). 
 
Microfinance institutions tend to have a pro-female bias (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). 
According to Ledgerwood (1999), MFIs take a special interest in women relative to men 
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because the former are relatively poor, are responsible for child-bearing and have fewer 
income-earning opportunities. In addition, they target women because this enables them to 
accomplish the dual objectives of achieving high repayment rates and meeting social goals 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). This outcome is perpetuated by gender segregation backed 
by patriarchal social structures (Mpuga, 2010). Such structures tend to confer differential 
power to the sexes with men having superior rights over collateralizable assets such as land. In 
some cases, women are turned away from banks when they apply for loans based on the 
perception that they are unable to control household income (Ledgerwood, 1999; Armendariz 
and Morduch, 2010). D’espallier et al. (2011) has provided evidence to show that a higher 
proportion of women in the gross loan portfolio is significantly correlated with lower non-
performing loans, fewer loan losses and lower provision for doubtful debts. This evidence 
indicates that women are better credit risks compared to their male counterparts. 
 
The theoretical basis of the pro-female bias in microfinance is threefold (Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2010). First, financial discrimination theories suggest that women have restricted 
access to financial markets. Since women have less access to capital than men, the neoclassical 
theory predicts that the return to capital for women should be higher than for men. Secondly, 
according to the labor mobility thesis, women tend to be more occupationally immobile 
compared to men. This is because they stay at home and work near home. Less mobility lowers 
the incidence of strategic default under the fear of social sanctions. This makes it easier and 
less costly to monitor their loans. Lastly, women tend to be more risk averse than men (Parker, 
2018). Being less mobile, avoiding social sanctions, being less likely to divert their loans 
towards unproductive activities and being risk averse determine the type investment projects 
that women undertake. Such investments will tend to have more predictable returns, making 
women better borrowers because the chances for default are fewer.    
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Lifecycle theory of consumption suggests that age is a critical factor affecting demand for 
loans.  According to Deaton (2012), young and old people borrow more because their income 
is less than their consumption while middle income people save more because their income 
exceeds consumption. Young people tend to save so that they have money to spend during their 
retirement. In terms of wealth, very young and very old people have little wealth. Peak wealth 
is achieved just when people retire. As they get much older, retirees tend to shed off their 
wealth to provide for food, housing and recreation. These assets are taken up by the young, 
who still have an appetite for wealth. The assets follow a life-cycle pattern changing hands 
from the old to the young over time.  
 
Human capital theory, which has its origins in the neoclassical paradigm, postulates that 
educated and trained people are more productive because they possess skills, knowledge, 
values and habits that they acquire in school (Quiggin, 1999).  Educated individuals have more 
assets, higher incomes and are more likely to engage in business activities. In relation to credit 
markets, educated people are more likely to appreciate the benefits and cost of credit compared 
to non-educated individuals. In addition, they can readily obtain financial information on 
sources of loans, the borrowing process, the terms of the loans and so on. They may also possess 
better book keeping and management skills which enable them to maintain proper loan books 
and service their loans.     
 
Social capital theory has popularized group lending technologies in microfinance. Solidarity or 
group lending is a lending approach mainly used in microfinance where small groups borrow 
based on social collateral (rather financial collateral) to lower default risk and where peer 
monitoring and social sanctions are used by members to lower moral hazard in lending 
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(Armendariz and Murdoch, 2010). Membership in a group is used as collateral to help the poor 
access capital for investment (Fernando, 2006). Viewed from this perspective, groups become 
avenues through which transaction costs are reduced and women are empowered. Solidarity 
groups are able to lower transaction costs because they foster communication and information-
sharing. The dense associational networks in groups makes them an avenue for knowing more 
about the behaviour of other members as well as lenders. Under group formation, members 
exchange information, apply social sanctions and use joint liability as mechanisms for reducing 
informational problems in lending. In terms of empowerment, microcredit helps members, 
mainly women, to engage in income-earning activities thus reducing their dependence on their 
spouses.    
 
Distance theory postulates that long distance between a borrower and a lender can act as an 
access barrier because of the escalation of transaction costs, monitoring costs and information 
asymmetry (Weber et al., 2012). Quite often, rural areas suffer from geographical isolation due 
to infrastructural deficiencies. In addition, they tend to have a less diversified economic 
structure and are exposed to covariant risks. Therefore, people in rural areas suffer from 
informational challenges – availability, quality and asymmetry. Due to infrastructural 
bottlenecks, individuals located in rural areas tend to travel long distances to access banking 
services. Offering mobile-based financial services affords them low-cost, safe and secure 
financial services (Qiang et al., 2012). Mobile phones also help to forestall problems of 
information asymmetry. They help people communicate with one another, obtain information 
on prices and quality and break into new markets (West, 2012).    
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4.3.2 Empirical Literature 
 
Several studies have examined the factors that determine access to credit (Li et al., 2011; Khoi 
et al., 2013; Mohieldin and Wright, 2000; Akoten et al., 2006; Okurut, 2006; Dutta and 
Magableh, 2006 and many others). These determinants can be grouped under five broad 
categories: individual characteristics, household characteristics, financial factors, sector-level 
attributes and macro-institutional factors. The most common factors identified in the literature 
fall under individual and household characteristics. These include age, gender, marital status, 
religion, schooling, employment status, ethnic group, race, occupation, wage, risk aversion and 
group membership.  
 
Age is usually included in studies on credit to capture life-cycle effects which have been 
hypothesized to be non-linear and therefore accommodated by the inclusion of age and age-
squared terms in the same regression (Okurut, 2006; Dutta and Magableh, 2006; Campbell, 
2006; Manrique and Ojah, 2004; Kimuyu and Omiti, 2000; Steiner et al., 2009). Generally, old 
and young people borrow more compared to middle aged persons. Young people borrow more 
because their consumption exceeds their income. They borrow in order to finance their 
schooling and human capital investments. Middle aged people are economically active and 
tend to borrow less since their income exceeds their savings. Older persons may rely more on 
dis-savings than on loans to finance their consumption needs. Okurut et al. (2005) shows not 
only that older individuals are more likely to apply for informal sector loans, but they also 
demand and receive bigger loans and they are less likely to be credit rationed. This can be 
attributed to the effect of social networks among old people who tend to have more friends and 
acquaintances than young people. However, when the loan application process is analysed 
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sequentially from application, loan screening, approval and disbursement, Mpuga (2000) 
shows that this does not necessarily hold. He finds that age non-linearly determines the 
probability of applying for credit as well as the amount applied for. However, age has no effect 
on the likelihood that the application is successful and does not determine the amount received. 
Barslund and Tarp (2008) find that a 1% increase in the age of the household head increases 
the probability of borrowing by 0.41%. 
 
Gender is usually included in demand for loans regressions to account for the effects of social 
norms that affect power relations between the sexes and segregate economic activities (Dutta 
and Magableh, 2006). Empirical evidence is not agreed on the direction and magnitude of the 
effect of the gender factor on access to credit. Barslund and Tarp (2008) find that being male 
rather than female lowers the probability of borrowing while Manrique and Ojah (2004) 
establish that being male rather than female increases the probability of being credit 
unconstrained. According to the latter study, being male rather than female increases the 
propensity of being unconstrained by 7.1 percentage points. However, men have 1.1% and 1% 
lesser chance of holding a consumption loan and real estate loan, respectively. Zeller (1994) 
shows that being male rather than female increases both the chance of being credit constrained 
as well as being more likely to apply for credit. Kenyan and Ugandan evidence is provided by 
Johnson and Nina-Zarazua (2009). In Kenya, gender does not affect the likelihood that one is 
formally included in the financial sector but being male rather than female increases the 
likelihood of being financially included in the informal sector. In Uganda, those who are 
included in both formal and informal sectors are more likely to be men rather than women. In 
Jordan, Dutta and Magableh (2006) show that men are less likely to apply for microcredit 
compared to women. However, the gender factor is not important in determining the demand 
for microcredit and the probability of being credit-constrained. 
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Empirical evidence on the effects of education on access to credit is mixed. Education level 
accounts for human capital endowment (Bending et al., 2009) and management ability (Dutta 
and Magableh, 2006). In Kenya and Uganda, evidence indicates that educated individuals have 
higher chances of being financially included in formal and informal sectors compared to those 
with no formal education (Johnson and Nina-Zarazua, 2009). Zeller (1994) shows that both the 
probability of being credit constrained and the probability of applying for credit are positively 
and significantly correlated with years of schooling. Evidence from South Africa shows that 
education is positively and significantly correlated with the access to bank and formal credit 
but is negatively and significantly correlated with informal credit (Okurut, 2006). However, 
schooling has no effect on access to semi-formal credit. Using Chinese data, Cheng (2007) 
finds that years of schooling have no effect on the demand for microcredit. However, the years 
of schooling among housewives reduces the demand for microcredit. In fact, an extra year of 
schooling lowers the propensity to borrow by 1.8%.   
 
Family business theory postulates that married individuals who are in business are more likely 
to attract their spouses into business (Simoes et al., 2016). Marriage tends to pool the networks, 
acquaintances, assets, skills and knowledge of the couple (Taniguchi, 2002; Wu and Wu, 2015; 
Parker, 2018). Being married reflects stability, responsibility and maturity (Mpuga, 2010) 
while being single may reflect independence from family (Dutta and Magableh, 2006). These 
facts suggest that married individuals may receive more favourable treatment in credit markets 
compared to their unmarried counterparts. Effects of marriage on participation in credit markets 
is mixed. Dutta and Magableh (2016) find that being single compared to being married, 
separated, widowed etc, increases the likelihood of applying for a loan and demand for credit 
but has no effect on the likelihood of being credit constrained and on the supply of credit. Duy 
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et al. (2012) confirm that marriage is a predictor of credit access in Vitenam. Mpuga (2010) 
shows that being married rather than being single increases the likelihood of applying for credit, 
the amount of credit demanded, the success of the loan application and the amount of credit 
supplied.   
 
Usually, larger families not only increase the rate of time preference (Manrique and Ojah, 
2004) but they also increase dependency (Li et al., 2011; Duta and Magableh, 2016). This 
means that such families tend to have higher consumption in the present period rather than in 
the future. This consumption pattern increases the burden of the household head to provide for 
the family, which increases the probability of loan default, and thus lowers access to credit. 
Evidence, however, shows that this is not necessarily true. Nguyen (2005) shows that 
household size increases the propensity of borrowing but does not affect the amount of loan 
received while Pal (2002) finds that household size enhances the demand for both formal and 
informal rural credit in India. Mpuga (2010) finds that household size negatively and 
significantly predicts the probability to apply for microcredit, the probability of the application 
being successful and the amount of loan applied for. Okurut et al. (2005) shows that the 
dependency ratio is positively correlated with the likelihood of applying for a loan from the 
informal sector and the amount of loan demanded. Swain (2007) finds that dependency 
significantly predicts the supply of credit but does not predict the demand for credit. Crook 
(2001) shows that household size negatively affects the likelihood of not being credit 
constrained.     
 
Financial and wealth considerations have also been hypothesized to affect access to credit. 
These factors include collateral value (Atieno, 1997), total value of assets owned and income 
(Diagne, 1999; Li et al., 2011; Mohieldin and Wright, 2000; Campbell, 2006), loan default 
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(Barsland and Tarp, 2008), remittances (Steiner et al., 2009) and many others. In credit 
regressions, financial factors are included to account for the capacity to repay the loan, measure 
the strength of previous business relationships and assess the reputation of the borrower 
(Okurut, 2006). Individuals with more income and assets will have access to credit markets 
because they are able to raise the collateral required by lenders.  Evidence from Kenya and 
Uganda shows that household assets are significant predictors of both financial inclusion in 
both formal and informal markets (Johnson and Nina-Zarazua, 2009). Li et al. (2011) find that 
a one-unit increase in assets lowers the probability to borrow by 0.6 percentage points while a 
one instant rise in income increases the probability to borrow by 0.12 percentage points. 
Mohieldin and Wright (2000) find that ownership of assets lowers the likelihood of borrowing 
from formal sources but it increases the likelihood of borrowing from informal sources. 
Campbell (2006) finds that wealth has no significant effect on the probability of holding both 
public and private equities. However, income significantly lowers the propensity of holding 
private equity but increases the propensity of holding public equity.    
 
One of the main functions of credit markets is to facilitate the trade, diversification and 
management of risk (Moyi, 2013). This explains why households resort to financial markets as 
a shock coping mechanism. Such shocks include illness, floods, drought and death (Diagne, 
1999; Zeller, 1994; Steiner et al., 2009; Barsland and Tarp, 2008). Steiner et al. (2009) find 
that households that had experienced death of a member in the previous 5 years were more 
likely to save. However, those households that experienced illness of a member within the 
previous 5 years were more likely to borrow and purchase insurance. Households that 
experienced any other shocks, were more likely to save and borrow but less likely to purchase 
insurance. Barsland and Tarp (2008) do not establish any significant role for hospitalisation (as 
a proxy for shocks) in the propensity to borrow by households in Vietnam. 
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Geographical factors include distance between the household and the nearest financial 
institution (Li et al., 2011; Nguyen, 2005; Swain, 2007), area terrain (Bhanot et al., 2012) and 
location (Mpuga, 2010; Duy, 2012; Crook; 2001). One of the main advantages of MFS is the 
reduction of costs related to distance and transactions. Households that are located in rural areas 
are more exposed to covariate risks, have a less diversified economic base and experience 
higher transaction costs (Ledgerwood, 1999). Li et al. (2011) find that households that are 
located over 10 kilometres from the financial institution are less likely to borrow from the 
Chinese rural microcredit markets. Specifically, being located over 10 kilometres from the 
financial institution compared to being located less than 10 kilometres reduces the likelihood 
of borrowing by 24% points. In India, Bhanot et al. (2012) find that distance from the bank 
does not significantly affect financial inclusion but the distance between the household and the 
post office negatively affects financial inclusion. Nguyen (2005) finds that distance to 
Government banks and the bank for Agriculture and Rural Development were not significant 
predictors of the propensity to borrow as well as the demand for credit. Swain (2007) 
establishes a negative and statistically significant correlation between distance from the bank, 
on one hand, and the propensity to borrow and the loan size, on the other hand. The same study 
establishes a negative correlation between distance from the cooperative, on one hand, and the 
propensity to borrow and the size of the loan, on the other hand. 
 
Some studies have analysed the role of location in urban areas in the borrowing decision. Khoi 
et al. (2013) finds that being located in urban communes rather than rural ones lowers the 
propensity to borrow from both formal and informal credit markets. Okurut (2006) finds that 
households that are located in rural areas are less likely to access bank credit compared to their 
urban counterparts. When the different types of credit are compared, the study finds that being 
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located in a rural area rather than an urban one lowers access to formal, semi-formal and 
informal credit markets. Mpuga (2010) finds that being located in a rural area does not affect 
the probability of applying for credit and the amount applied. However, rural households 
receive much less credit compared to their urban counterparts.   
 
The studies that have been reviewed in this section show that the predictors of access to credit 
include individual, household, financial and geographical factors. However, no previous study 
has analysed the effect of MFS on access to credit. To fill this gap in knowledge, this study 
focuses on the effect of MFS on access to MFI credit in Kenya. Consistent with transaction 
cost theory and distance theory, digital platforms have the effect of reducing search and 
coordination costs without increasing transaction risks (Weber et al., 2012). Distance theory is 
premised on the idea that monitoring costs and information asymmetry increase in direct 
proportion to the geographical distance between the lender and the borrower. Microfinance is 
a transaction-intensive sector involving, in some cases, many poor clients transacting very 
small loans but spread over wide geographical areas. In such cases, MFS have the potential to 
reduce all these costs and therefore bridge the distance between the borrower and the lender. 
 
4.4 Methodology  
4.4.1 Data Type and Sources 
 
This study uses the 2013 and 2015 Kenya FinAccess survey data collected by the Financial 
Access Partnership comprising the Central Bank of Kenya (CBS), Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics (KNBS) and Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Trust. These surveys targeted adults 
above the age of 16 with the aim of generating quantitative measures of access to and demand 
for financial services in Kenya using nationally representative samples. Representativeness is 
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achieved by using the National Sample Survey and Evaluation Program V (NASSEP V) 
sampling frame constructed by KNBS. Sampling followed a three-stage process. At the first 
stage, 710 (in 2013) and 834 (in 2015) clusters were selected from the NASSEP V frame. At 
the second stage, 12 households (in 2013) and 14 households (in 2015) were selected in each 
cluster. Finally, 8520 (in 2013) and 10,008 (in 2015) individuals were selected to be 
interviewed. In 2013 and 2015, the response rates were 80% and 87% respectively. A structured 
questionnaire was the main tool used to collect data. Questionnaires were administered to all 
adult members of the sampled households.  
The two surveys are not directly comparable for two reasons. Firstly, they are not a panel; the 
responses in 2013 and 2015 were not derived from the same individuals. Lastly, the 
questionnaires used in 2013 and 2015 were different. Even for the same variables, there were 
differences in coding and the 2015 questionnaire had more questions compared to the 2013 
one. Therefore, it was not possible to pool the data from the two surveys. This explains why 
analysis in the proceeding sections is presented separately for each year.  
4.4.2 Model Specification 
 
Many studies that examined the determinants of access to credit used probit (Khoi et al., 2013; 
Mohieldin and Wright, 2000; Akoten et al., 2006; Campbell, 2006; Cheng, 2007 and many 
others), logit (Li et al., 2011; Okurut, 2006; Dutta and Magableh, 2006 and many others) and 
multinomial logit approaches. Depending on study focus, some authors have used a 
combination of these three methods (Okurut, 2006; Mpuga, 2010; Okurut et al., 2005). The 
current study, following the relevant literature also treats access to microcredit as a binary 
variable. In these studies, access to credit is considered a discrete choice problem where the 
respondent has either used the service or not – conditional on household characteristics, 
individual characteristics, institutional factors, infrastructural factors and so on.  
 87 
 
 
In this study, the outcome variable (y) represents the probability of borrowing from an MFI. 
Variable y takes a value of 1 if a household has ever used credit from a microfinance 
institution19 and 0 otherwise. As described by Cameron and Trivedi (2010), this can be 
expressed below; 
 
𝑦 = {
1        𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝
0 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − 𝑝
  
The outcome variable (y), follows a Bernoulli distribution, with one tail. If the probability of 
using MFI credit by individual i is 𝑝𝑖, then the probability of not using MFI credit will be (1 - 
𝑝𝑖). This implies that the discrete probability density function is 
𝑓(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖
𝑦𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑖)
1−𝑦𝑖,               yi = 0,1     (7) 
Where 0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1, 𝐸(𝑦𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑖). For regression purposes, the 
probability p varies across individuals and households given the regressors. Given equation 
(7), the conditional probability of 𝑝𝑖 can be expressed as 
𝑝𝑖 = Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥) = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)        (8) 
Where x is a K×1 vector of independent variables, β is a vector of unknown coefficients for 
independent variables and 𝐹(. ) is a cumulative density function on (-ꝏ, +ꝏ). Assuming that 
𝐹(. ) is a standard normal cumulative density function yields a probit model, which is specified 
in equation (9).   
                                                          
19 FinAccess (2016) defines an MFI as a financial provider who is legally registered and/or operates through direct 
government interventions. This excludes microfinance banks. Microfinance banks are subject to all banking 
regulations making them less likely to focus on the social mission. For purposes of this study, access to loans from 
SACCOs and MFIs were collapsed to yield the variable MFI loan. The questionnaire captured these two strands 
separately. 
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𝑝𝑖 = Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥) = 𝛷(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) = ∫ 𝜙
𝑥𝑖
′𝛽
−ꝏ
(𝑧)𝑑𝑧 = ∫
1
√2𝜋
exp (−𝑧
2
2⁄ )
𝑥𝑖
′𝛽
−ꝏ
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Vector 𝑥 contains independent variables, which include age, gender, marital status, schooling, 
monthly income, household size, location, M-money, M-banking and M-credit. These 
variables are defined in Section 4.4.3.  
In equation (9), it is suspected that access to credit and monthly income are jointly determined. 
Unobservable shocks that affect an individual’s decision to borrow also affect the individual’s 
income. Therefore, income is endogenous. This means that any probit estimates obtained from 
equation (9) will be inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2013). Therefore, this study adopts an 
instrumental variable technique to deal with the econometric problem of endogeneity. The 
study used two instruments. For the 2013 dataset, the number of rooms the household occupies 
is used as an instrument. For the 2015 dataset, the study used the time taken to complete the 
questionnaire as the instrument. The use of number of rooms occupied by the household is 
justified by the fact that people with higher incomes tend to occupy houses with more rooms. 
However, their decision to live in more rooms is unrelated to their desire to take out a loan. 
One may argue that a house is a collateralizable asset, which invalidates its use as an 
instrument. Whereas this argument may hold regarding bank credit, it does not hold in the case 
of microcredit since many studies show that social collateral (by use of joint liability or 
availability of a guarantor) is more important than financial collateral (Armendariz and 
Murdoch, 2010). Hence, it can be argued that financial collateral is not directly correlated with 
the decision to obtain MFI credit although an indirect link can be inferred. Again, if the 
household occupies a rented house or a house that is not permanent, then the collateral 
argument breaks down because such a house cannot be used as loan collateral. Similarly, the 
use of duration (or the time taken to complete the questionnaire) as an instrument for income 
can be justified on the basis that people with higher incomes are more educated and have higher 
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cognitive skills. This being the case, there are two possible outcomes. First: compared to people 
with lower cognitive skills and low incomes, these respondents tend to be more inquisitive 
when confronted with a questionnaire, which may extend the interview sessions. In the second 
case, people with higher incomes and with higher cognitive skills can understand the questions 
faster and will take a shorter time to complete the questionnaire. Given this ambiguity, this 
instrument was subjected to the data in order to determine the direction of the relationship and 
its validity. The results are discussed in Section 4.5.2.    
 
4.4.3 Definition of Variables 
The main focus of this study is to determine the extent to which MFS affect access to 
microfinance credit, controlling for individual and household characteristics. The dependent 
variable is MFI loan, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a household has ever 
used a loan from a microfinance institution and 0 otherwise. Mobile-based financial services 
are captured by three variables: M-money, M-banking, M-credit. M-money is a dummy variable 
that takes 1 if a respondent has ever used M-money and 0 otherwise. Likewise, M-banking is 
coded 1 if the respondent has ever used the financial service and 0 if not. M-credit takes a value 
of 1 if the respondent has ever received credit from either M-Shwari or KCB MPESA and 0 
otherwise. Individual factors include income, age, gender, household conditions, marital status 
and education level.  
During the two periods, income was measured slightly differently; the 2013 and 2015 income 
measures may not be directly comparable. In 2013, income was captured as gross monthly 
earnings (in Kenya shillings) while in 2015, it was captured as monthly income (in Kenya 
shillings). In all regressions, income, age and household size are used in their log-normalized 
form. The variable age is measured in years. Gender is captured by the variable male which 
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takes the value 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if female. Marital status is captured by the 
variable married, which is coded 1 if the respondent is married or living with a partner and 0 
if single, divorced/separated and widowed. Education achievement is captured by the variable 
education, which takes the value 1 if the respondent completed either primary, secondary or 
tertiary schooling and 0 otherwise. The study accounts for two household factors: size and 
location. Household size is captured by the number of members in a household. Location of 
the household is captured by the variable rural which is coded 1 if the household belongs to a 
rural cluster and 0 otherwise. In 2013, poverty was determined by applying the KNBS poverty 
line. However, in 2015, poverty was measured by applying wealth quintiles. Quintiles were 
formed after constructing a wealth index using a principal components technique. This 
technique constructs a composite wealth index using the first principal component of a vector 
of assets (durable goods, housing characteristics and access to utilities). Any household that 
falls in the 1st and 2nd quintile was considered to be poor while one that fell in either 3rd, 4th or 
5th quintile was considered non-poor. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions are presented in Appendix Table 
A10. The results show that penetration by MFIs in Kenya has increased from around 10% in 
2013 to 11% in 2015. Compared to microfinance products, the market reach of M-money is 
significantly higher and the growth of M-money penetration is also much faster than the growth 
of MFI penetration. Between 2013 and 2015, the use of M-money had grown from about 62% 
to 69%. The use of M-banking and M-credit is also growing in importance. It is notable that 
even though the first M-credit product was launched in Kenya in 2012, about 10% of Kenyans 
had accessed M-credit by 2015.  
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Mean income is Ksh 16,092 (approximately USD 161) in 2015 and Ksh 7,228 (approximately 
USD 72) in 2013. The standard deviation in 2015 is Ksh 181,685 (approximately USD 1817), 
which is almost 11 times the mean. In 2013, the standard deviation is Ksh 17,526 
(approximately USD 175), which is almost twice the mean. It can be concluded that income is 
very highly dispersed across individuals as shown by the high standard deviations. Similarly, 
comparisons between mean incomes (Ksh 16,092 in 2015 and Ksh 7,228 in 2013) and median 
incomes (Ksh 6,000 or USD 60 in 2015 and Ksh 3,000 or USD 30 in 2013) shows that this 
variable is considerably skewed and has thick tails. This also implies most incomes are 
concentrated within the lower percentiles. The same applies to age and household size. This 
partially explains why these variables (income, age and household size) were log normalized 
before being used in the regressions. 
The sample has more women than men (59% in 2013, 61% in 2015), more urban than rural 
households in 2013 (64%) but more rural than urban households in 2015 (56%). Most 
respondents are educated (85% in 2013, 82% in 2015) and are married (64% in 2013, 60% in 
2015). The level of poverty is high (over 30% in both periods) and highly variable.  
 
4.5.2 Regression Results 
Before running the regressions, the data was checked for pairwise correlations of the regressors. 
Appendix Tables A11 and A12 show that most of the coefficients fall below 0.5, which implies 
that multicollinearity is not a serious problem in the regressions. In 2013, the highest 
correlation coefficient is 0.344 between education and M-money, which does not pose any 
multicollinearity concerns. In 2015, the highest correlation coefficient was 0.670 between M-
credit and M-banking. The coefficient 0.670 is high and suggests that inclusion of both M-
credit and M-banking in a regression could occasion multicollinearity. Therefore, the two 
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variables are entered in the regressions separately. As explained in Section 4.4.2, income is 
endogenous. This is due to the suspicion that reverse causality between credit and income is 
likely to compromise the consistency of the coefficient estimates. Given these concerns, 
instrumental variable estimators are adopted to forestall this problem. For income, the 
instrument must satisfy two conditions (Wooldridge, 2013).  Firstly, the instrument should be 
uncorrelated with the error term generated from equation 3. Secondly, the instrument should 
be highly correlated with income - referred to as “instrument validity”. This study used the 
number of rooms occupied by a household (for 2013 data) and the time taken by a respondent 
to complete the questionnaire, or duration, (for 2015 data) as instruments for income.  
Diagnostic statistics are reported in the bottom rows of each table. For each regression model, 
three assessments were conducted: (1) instrument validity tests, (2) tests for endogeneity of 
income and (3) likelihood ratio tests of the statistical significance of the regressions. Testing 
the validity of the number of rooms as an instrument for income using a reduced form equation 
yields a coefficient of 0.18 (p<0.05). Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0 = instrument is not 
valid) is rejected, which means that the instrument is relevant for explaining variations in 
income. The coefficient on duration is 0.56 (p<0.05), which indicates that the time taken to 
complete the questionnaire has a statistically significant positive correlation with income. 
Duration passes the instrument validity test. Tests for the endogeneity of income are reported 
in Tables 7, 8 and 9. For all probit estimations20, the Wald tests for exogeneity (H0 = income is 
exogenous) have p-values falling below 0.10. This leads to the rejection of H0 at the 10% level 
implying that income is endogenous, which justifies the use of instrumental variable estimators 
as they yield more consistent estimates. Likelihood ratio chi-squared (LR Chi2) and the 
associated p-values of <0.05 show that the null (H0 = all the coefficients associated with 
                                                          
20 Stata output for 2SLS does not report exogeneity test results. 
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independent variables are simultaneously equal to zero) is rejected at conventional levels of 
significance.  The models are statistically significant as suggested by the Chi2 test statistic. 
4.5.2.1  Results Based on FinAccess 2013 Data 
Regression results based on 2013 data are presented in Table 8. Baseline findings for the whole 
sample are reported in column (a). Columns (b) and (c) report baseline results by poverty status. 
For comparison, instrument variable two stage least squares (hereafter, IV 2SLS) results are 
reported in columns (d), (e) and (f). Baseline findings in column (a) show that the coefficient 
on M-money is positive but statistically insignificant. However, the coefficient on M-money 
among the non-poor is positive and statistically significant (column c) but this coefficient is 
statistically insignificant among the poor (column b) suggesting that non-poor respondents who 
use M-money are more likely to use MFI credit. This implies that M-money plays a 
complementary role in accessing MFI credit only among the non-poor. On average, changing 
from not using M-money to using M-money increases the probability of accessing MFI credit 
by 3% among the non-poor (column f). However, the IV 2SLS results show that these IV probit 
estimates are not robust.  
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Table 8: IV estimates of the probability of using MFI credit (2013) 
 Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if ever used MFI loan, 0 otherwise 
  IV Probit   IV 2SLS  
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 All Poor Non-poor All Poor Non-poor 
M-money 0.01 -0.19 0.33*** -0.05** 0.04*** 0.03* 
 (0.104) (0.134) (0.107) (0.025) (0.011) (0.017) 
Income  0.83*** 1.40*** 0.95*** 0.24*** 0.03 0.26*** 
 (0.044) (0.054) (0.098) (0.038) (0.022) (0.040) 
Age  -1.14 -3.09 1.86 -0.96*** 0.27 0.08 
 (1.299) (1.982) (1.542) (0.314) (0.165) (0.267) 
Age squared 0.21 0.46* -0.20 0.14*** -0.03 -0.00 
 (0.177) (0.270) (0.211) (0.044) (0.023) (0.037) 
Male -0.33*** -0.10 -0.26*** -0.09*** -0.01 -0.06*** 
 (0.046) (0.076) (0.057) (0.019) (0.011) (0.016) 
Married -0.02 -0.17** 0.19*** -0.03* -0.00 0.03** 
 (0.064) (0.070) (0.072) (0.016) (0.011) (0.013) 
Education -0.10 -0.15 0.16 -0.05** 0.01 0.01 
 (0.104) (0.099) (0.142) (0.023) (0.014) (0.022) 
HH size 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02*** -0.02** 0.01 
 (0.035) (0.077) (0.045) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Rural -0.31*** -1.13*** -0.52*** -0.09*** -0.02 -0.14*** 
 (0.053) (0.096) (0.095) (0.020) (0.023) (0.030) 
No. of obs. 5,068 1,062 3,636 5,077 1,434 3,643 
Chi2 999 1382 519 266 38 292 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exogeneity test 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.142 0.000 
The dependent variable is usage of MFI credit dummy. Robust standard errors are reported (in parentheses).  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  All regressions include 
a constant and county21 dummies, which are not reported. However, the IVSLS regression in column 6 does not 
include county dummies in the main regression but does so in the auxiliary regression. Exogeneity test for IV 
2SLS is the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test as described in Cameron and Trivedi (2010). 
 
Apart from M-money, the 2013 results in column (a) show that the determinants of access to 
MFI supplied credit in Kenya are income, gender and type of cluster (rural/urban). However, 
analysing the sample by poverty status gives slightly varied results, especially among the non-
poor. Among this demographic, respondents with higher incomes, women, married individuals 
                                                          
21 Counties are administrative units. Administratively, Kenya has one national government and 47 county 
governments. 
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and those residing in urban areas are more likely to use MFI supplied credit. However, the poor 
who use MFI credit have higher incomes, are female, married and reside in urban areas.     
Income is associated with a significantly higher propensity for MFI credit.  This effect is robust 
to different estimators (IV probit and IV 2SLS) and varies by poverty status. Given that the 
mission of MFIs is to provide loans to the poor, the positive and significant effect of income 
on access to MFI credit should be of concern. It may indicate that microfinance is serving the 
non-poor (who have higher incomes) at the expense of the poor who should be the main 
beneficiaries. This result corroborates Crook’s (2001) and Turvey and Kong’s (2010) findings 
of a positive relationship between demand for microcredit and income.  
The coefficient on the male variable is negative and statistically significant (column a). On 
average, being male is associated with a lower probability of using MFI credit. This finding is 
robust to IV probit and IV 2SLS estimators. This result is expected because women constitute 
about 62% of the MFI clients in Kenya (AMFI, 2013). The focus on women by MFIs is guided 
by the empirical fact that they are better credit risks compared to men (D’espallier et al., 2011). 
Women are targeted by MFIs because they represent a large proportion of the poorest segment 
of the society and they have fewer economic opportunities (Ledgerwood, 1999) occasioned by 
lopsided power relations and family structures that disenfranchise them.  
Results in column (a) show that the type of cluster significantly impacts access to microcredit, 
which is consistent with Mpuga (2010). On average, being located in a rural area compared to 
being located in an urban area decreases the probability of using MFI credit. However, this 
effect is stronger among poor respondents compared to their non-poor counterparts, implying 
that there is a possibility that rural households do not benefit much from the expansion that has 
been witnessed in microfinance markets. Given that MFIs target poor households who are 
predominantly based in rural areas, this result is surprising. It may be explained by the fact that 
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many MFIs, like traditional banks, are located in urban areas, making them less accessible to 
rural households.  
4.5.2.2 Results Based on 2015 FinAccess Data 
Regression results based on 2015 data are reported in Table 9. Results from baseline IV probit 
regressions are reported in columns (a), (b) and (c). To establish robustness of the findings, IV 
2SLS results are presented in columns (d), (e) and (f). Diagnostics are reported at the bottom 
of Table 8. Chi square tests suggest that the models are statistically significant. For estimation 
results, the Wald tests for exogeneity (H0 = income is exogenous) have p-values falling below 
0.05. Therefore, H0 is rejected at the 0.05 level implying that the income is endogenous. The 
use of instrumental variable estimators is thus empirically supported.   
Most of the explanatory variables are statistically significant and have the expected signs, 
except for age which is negative. Specifically, the results show that probability to use MFI 
credit is lower among those using M-banking and M-credit as well as among males and married 
persons. However, higher income, being educated, higher household size and being located in 
a rural cluster is associated with a higher probability to use MFI credit. In, addition, the results 
suggest a U-shaped relationship between the probability of using MFI credit and age.  
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Table 9: Estimates of the probability of using MFI credit (2015) – Baseline results 
 Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if ever used MFI loan, 0 otherwise 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit IV 2SLS IV 2SLS IV 2SLS 
M-money -0.00   -0.06***   
 (0.076)   (0.018)   
M-banking  -0.18***   -0.04**  
  (0.055)   (0.019)  
M-credit   -0.20***   -0.03 
   (0.060)   (0.022) 
Income 0.85*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) 
Age -2.10* -2.35* -2.45* -1.83*** -1.96*** -1.94*** 
 (1.270) (1.343) (1.329) (0.323) (0.347) (0.342) 
Age square  0.38** 0.41** 0.42** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
 (0.168) (0.178) (0.176) (0.045) (0.048) (0.047) 
Male -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.39*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Married -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Education 0.15* 0.14* 0.14* 0.03* 0.02 0.02 
 (0.079) (0.083) (0.083) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Household size 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Rural 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
No of obs. 8,142 8,142 8,142 8,529 8,529 8,529 
Chi2 2833 2769 2719 672 681 692 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exogeneity test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is usage of microcredit dummy. IV refers to instrumental variable. Robust standard 
errors are reported (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  All regressions include a constant and county dummies but are not reported. n/a refers to not 
applicable. Exogeneity test for IV 2SLS is the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test as described in Cameron and Trivedi 
(2010). 
 
The results in columns (b) and (c) show that the use of M-banking and M-credit is associated 
with lower probability of using MFI credit. However, column (a) shows that the coefficient on 
M-money is not statistically significant. The predicted probability of borrowing from an MFI 
is on average around 0.04 lower for those who have ever used M-banking compared to those 
who have never used M-banking. On average, using M-credit, compared to not using M-credit, 
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decreases the probability of using microfinance credit by 0.03. These results suggest that M-
money and M-credit, on one hand, and MFI credit, on the other hand, are substitutes. The fact 
that M-money and M-credit give users an advantage in terms of low transaction costs, fast 
speed and few distance barriers compared to use of MFI credit explains this preference.   
The coefficients on income, male and rural are statistically significant in 2013 and 2015. 
Whereas income and male have the same signs during the two periods, the sign of the 
coefficient on rural is inverted in 2015. In this year, the predicted probability of borrowing 
from an MFI is, on average, around 4% higher for households located in rural areas than for 
households located in urban areas. Results for the entire sample show that the coefficient on 
income is significantly positive and robust in all regressions implying that a higher level of 
income increases the propensity to use MFI credit. The increase in probability of using MFI 
credit for one-unit increase in log income is 23 percentage points. This result is consistent with 
Mohieldin and Wright (2000) who found that those who obtained formal sector loans tended 
to have high incomes. The result is also consistent with Johnson and Nina-Zarazua (2009), 
Campbell (2006), Crook (2001) and Turvey and Kong (2010).   
Age has a significantly non-linear relationship with the propensity to use MFI credit. This 
lifecycle effect follows a U-shape pattern. The results reveal a statistically significant negative 
impact of age on the likelihood of borrowing from an MFI. According to column (d), the 
probability of using MFI credit decreases with age until a threshold of 29.4 years, when this 
effect is reversed. After this age, older people are more likely to use MFI credit than younger 
ones. This finding is consistent with Okurut (2006), Campbell (2006) and Dutta and Magableh 
(2006) but contrasts many other studies that have established a concave relationship (Mpunga, 
2010; Zeller, 1994; Kimuyu and Omiti, 2000) where the signs on the coefficients for age and 
age squared are positive and negative, respectively.  
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The coefficient on the marital status variable is negative, statistically significant and robust in 
all regressions. On average, being married compared to being unmarried (which includes 
single, widowed, divorced and separated) decreases the probability of using microfinance 
credit by about 4%. The negative effect of marital status on propensity to borrow from an MFI 
is surprising and inconsistent with Khoi et al. (2013), Mpuga (2010), Dutta and Magableh 
(2006) and Akoten et al. (2006) who found a positive relationship between marriage and the 
propensity to borrow. This is because financial institutions view married people as more stable 
and reliable. The negative effect may be explained by the fact that married individuals are less 
independent since they have to consult their spouses before taking out a loan. The same does 
not apply to single, widowed, divorced and separated individuals who make unilateral loan 
decisions.  
Education increases the likelihood that the individuals have used MFI credit. The predicted 
probability of using MFI credit is on average around 3% points higher for those with formal 
education than for those without formal education. This is explained by the fact that education 
enhances the financial literacy and numeracy skills of individuals. Educated people have more 
skills and exposure to the external environment including risks (Li et al., 2011), pursue 
profitable entrepreneurship, understand the workings of credit arrangements and successfully 
manage loans (Kimuyu and Omiti, 2000). These factors enhance their demand for credit. This 
finding corroborates Johnson and Nino-Zarazua (2009) who found that the likelihood of 
educated people being financially excluded is much less compared to those without formal 
education. A positive and significant relationship between education and access to credit is also 
supported by Li et al. (2011), Khoi et al. (2013), Shem et al. (2012) and Zeller (1994).    
The coefficient on household size is significantly positive and robust in all regressions.  This 
implies that households with more members are more likely to use MFI credit compared to 
those with fewer members. This result differs from study findings by Li et al. (2011), Mpuga 
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(2010) and Manrique and Ojah (2004) who found a significant but negative relationship 
between household size and household access to credit. These findings are supported by the 
fact that the larger the household, the higher the rate of time preference and therefore the higher 
the value of consumption in each period of time compared to a smaller household size.  
4.5.2.3  Results Based on FinAccess 2015 by Poverty Status 
Table 10 presents results for IV probit estimates obtained using 2015 data. Chi square statistics 
show that all the regressions are statistically significant. Exogeneity tests justify the use of 
instrumental variable estimators. Most of the coefficients on the explanatory variables are 
statistically significant and have expected signs. Robustness of the results in Table 9 is 
evaluated against IV 2SLS results, which are provided in Appendix Table A13. 
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Table 10: IV Probit estimates of the probability of using MFI credit by poverty status (2015) 
 Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if ever used MFI loan, 0 otherwise 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
M-money -0.08 0.02     
 (0.113) (0.121)     
M-banking   -0.01 -0.19***   
   (0.136) (0.066)   
M-Credit     -0.01 -0.19*** 
     (0.162) (0.071) 
Income  0.87*** 0.83*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 
 (0.046) (0.041) (0.047) (0.041) (0.044) (0.040) 
Age -5.97*** -0.30 -5.97*** -1.15 -6.12*** -1.31 
 (1.914) (1.877) (2.171) (2.024) (2.060) (2.026) 
Age squared 0.88*** 0.14 0.89*** 0.25 0.90*** 0.27 
 (0.253) (0.247) (0.287) (0.266) (0.273) (0.267) 
Male -0.47*** -0.37*** -0.48*** -0.35*** -0.48*** -0.36*** 
 (0.053) (0.046) (0.056) (0.044) (0.055) (0.045) 
Married -0.25*** -0.09* -0.26*** -0.09* -0.26*** -0.09* 
 (0.059) (0.051) (0.061) (0.052) (0.060) (0.052) 
Education 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 
 (0.112) (0.123) (0.119) (0.125) (0.117) (0.125) 
HH Size 0.10* 0.11*** 0.11** 0.11*** 0.11** 0.12*** 
 (0.052) (0.033) (0.053) (0.033) (0.052) (0.033) 
Rural 0.05 0.18*** 0.06 0.17*** 0.06 0.17*** 
 (0.067) (0.045) (0.069) (0.045) (0.068) (0.045) 
No of obs. 2,756 4,935 2,756 4,935 2,756 4,935 
Chi2 1474 1669 1371 1683 1398 1665 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exogeneity 
test 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
The dependent variable is usage of microcredit dummy. IV refers to instrumental variable. Robust standard 
errors are reported (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  All regressions include a constant county dummies but these are not reported. 
 
When the sample is split on the basis of poverty, the effect of M-money on the probability to 
borrow from an MFI remains insignificant among both poor and non-poor respondents. 
However, the effect of M-banking and M-credit on the probability to borrow from an MFI is 
negative and statistically significant among the non-poor but insignificant among the poor. 
Among the non-poor, the predicted probability of using MFI credit is on average around 7% 
higher for those who have ever used M-banking than for those who had never used M-banking 
(p<0.01). On average, a change from never using M-credit to using M-credit decreases the 
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probability of using MFI credit by 5% among the non-poor (p<0.05). Two key conclusions can 
be drawn from these findings. First: the emergence of M-banking and M-credit in Kenya’s 
finance sector seems to be displacing the uptake of microfinance services among non-poor 
households. Secondly, M-money, M-banking and M-credit have not been instrumental in 
helping poor households to access microfinance services. This is surprising since MFS have 
been touted to drive the empowerment of the poor.   
Apart from mobile-based financial services, other factors that determine the propensity to use 
MFI credit among the poor include income, age, gender, marital status and household size. 
Among the non-poor, the factors that determine the propensity to use MFI credit include 
income, gender, marital status, household size and type of cluster (or location).  
 
4.6 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
Many studies belabour the wide differences in access to credit across individuals and 
households. Personal characteristics (such as age, gender, education, employment status, 
income and many others) plus household descriptors (such as family size, consumption, assets 
and poverty level among others) dominate the explanations as to why these disparities exist. 
Few studies analyse the role of MFS in determining access to credit. However, this 
investigation identifies the predictors of Kenyans’ propensity to use MFI credit with a focus 
on the effects of M-money, M-banking and M-credit. It applies a discrete choice framework 
using 2013 (N=6449) and 2015 (N=8665) household data. Due to endogeneity concerns arising 
from reverse causality between borrowing and income, the study employed instrument variable 
estimators. This approach is validated by tests for endogeneity of income and instrument 
validity tests. The predictors of the propensity to use MFI credit in 2015 are M-banking, M-
credit, income, age, gender, marital status, schooling, household size and cluster type. In 2013, 
 103 
 
the likelihood of using MFI credit is determined by income, gender and cluster type. In both 
2013 and 2015, the effect of M-credit on the probability of borrowing from an MFI is negative 
but is not robust to the use of different estimators.   
Four issues of concern stand out from the findings. Firstly, income is significantly associated 
with a higher propensity to use MFI credit. Had MFIs been serving the poor in line with their 
mission, the relationship would be negative. A positive sign implies that the non-poor are 
crowding out the poor from microfinance markets. The second key observation is that the sign 
on M-banking is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the use of this service is 
dislocating the users away from the use of MFI credit. Given that some banks and MFIs have 
started to migrate towards M-banking platforms, this finding may be a pointer to the fact that 
these interventions are bearing fruit especially with the rising competition in the finance sector. 
Thirdly, the significantly negative relationship between using M-credit and the likelihood of 
using MFI credit implies that M-credit applications in Kenya are shifting customers away from 
MFIs. Fourthly, analysis of the data by poverty status reveals that the coefficients on M-
banking and M-credit are negative and statistically significant among non-poor households but 
negative and insignificant among poor households. This suggests that the negative effects of 
M-banking and M-credit on the propensity to use MFI credit observed at the aggregate level 
are largely driven by the negative impacts of M-banking and M-credit on the likelihood of non-
poor households to access microcredit. While it is evident that these financial innovations are 
helping the non-poor to shift away from MFI credit, the poor are being left out of these shifts. 
Ironically, these applications are widening the digital divide between the poor and non-poor in 
the microfinance sector yet they are expected to empower low-income households and close 
the existing gaps between the two groups. 
In terms of policy, it is recommended that MFIs improve their client targeting process in order 
to focus their lending towards the poor. In part, they should target sectors with heavy 
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concentrations of the poor and apply credit scoring approaches that recognize the 
characteristics of poorer clients. To enhance the role of M-credit in players in the MFI sector 
should explore partnerships with the developers of the M-credit apps. This will help to integrate 
MFI services and M-credit.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
In recent years, particularly since 2000, there has been a surge in lending by microfinance 
institutions in SSA. Since loan growth in microfinance is an indicator of poverty outreach and 
financial inclusion, there has been much excitement about “banking the poor” through 
microfinance. However, along with this excitement, there is heightened concern among 
practitioners, researchers and regulators following the rising loan delinquencies in the MFI 
sector. In fact, many MFIs have either collapsed or have been declared insolvent. These 
outcomes threaten the stability and financial health of these institutions. Unfortunately, little is 
known on how loan growth, especially when it is excessive, affects credit risk in SSA MFIs as 
well as the drivers of both credit risk and loan growth in SSA microfinance markets. In addition, 
research is yet to establish the effect of MFS on access to microfinance.   
With this background in mind, this thesis is motivated by the remarkable loan growth and the 
rising credit risk that MFIs experienced as well as by the fact that SSA has been neglected in 
the relevant literature. The thesis has contributed to knowledge in several ways. First, it has 
provided evidence from SSA on the predictors of MFIs’ loan growth (Chapter two) and credit 
risk (Chapter three). Second, it has provided evidence on the factors that determine access to 
MFIs credit (Chapter four) by paying particular attention to the effects of MFS, an aspect that 
was ignored in previous studies. Finally, the thesis has overcome the limitations of previous 
studies that employed static regressions (which are limited in dealing with panel endogeneity 
bias) by paying particular attention to dynamic aspects of loan growth and credit risk.  
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Chapters two and three, which approached microfinance from the supply-side, considered the 
lending behaviour in MFIs and whether excessive lending was associated with higher risk 
exposure.  Specifically, the two Chapters examined the predictors of loan growth and credit 
risk, respectively. The two Chapters also provided international comparisons, which was useful 
as it allowed the evaluation of whether factors that turned out significant in SSA were also 
important elsewhere. To achieve these objectives, the two Chapters applied system generalised 
method of moments estimators on data from 37 SSA countries covering the period from 2004 
to 2014. This data was assembled from four sources – MIX dataset, World Development 
Indicators, World Governance Indicators and Doing Business Indicators. Chapter four, which 
approached microfinance from the demand-side, examined some of the potential barriers to 
accessing MFI credit at the household level in Kenya but paid particular attention to the role 
of MFS. Chapter four applied instrumental variable discrete models on FinAccess data sets 
(2013 and 2016) and accommodated endogeneity in the models. Unlike Chapters two and three, 
Chapter four focused on Kenya because the country out-performs other Sub-Sahara African 
countries in terms of financial and digital inclusion, which has been attributed to the explosion 
in the M-PESA (mobile money) financial innovation that has drastically altered the way people 
save, borrow and transact.  
Evidence in Chapters two and three supports the existence of trade-offs between loan growth 
and risk. This implies that those MFIs that recorded higher loan growth were facing lower risk 
exposure and vice versa. In addition, Chapter three established the existence of threshold 
effects in the relationship between credit risk and loan growth, which suggests that excessive 
loan growth is harmful to the stability and financial health of the MFIs. In fact, credit risk fell 
with loan growth until a trough at 36% when this relationship was reversed. Analyses in 
Chapters two and three revealed that dynamics were important in predicting both loan growth 
and risk indicating that these two variables were persistent and some divergence mechanism 
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was at play. In other words, MFIs that recorded higher loan growth (or risk) in one year were 
more likely to record higher loan growth (or risk) in the following year. Further evidence in 
Chapter two showed that loan growth was higher in MFIs that were having higher capital-asset 
ratios, in countries that were having better economic prospects and in those countries with 
sound private sector policies and regulations. Against expectations, loan growth was faster in 
countries that were having poor legal rights of borrowers and lenders. This was attributed to 
the fact that the legal reforms that sought to promote the rights of borrowers and lenders may 
have made it costlier for MFIs to increase lending in a fully compliant way. 
In Chapter three, credit risk was found to be higher in MFIs that made high provisions for loan 
impairment, which was unexpected because the conventional use of these provisions for loan 
impairment is by regulators to internalize credit risk. Therefore, the positive relationship 
between credit risk and provisions for loan defaults should worry prudential regulators of MFIs. 
The Chapter also established a negative relationship between credit risk and GDP per capita 
growth, which showed that higher incomes in the economy were associated with lower default 
risk. MFIs that were located in countries with ease of getting credit tended to suffer from high 
loan default rates as a result of the exposure of MFIs to moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. 
One of the objectives of Chapters two and three was to establish whether the factors that turned 
out significant in SSA regressions remained statistically significant in the regressions for EAP, 
EECA, LAC and SA. Regarding loan growth (Chapter two), three factors were statistically 
significant across all regions: lagged loan growth, credit risk and regulatory quality. However, 
the coefficients on these factors varied across all the regions, implying that the impacts were 
heterogenous. In addition to the three factors that were statistically significant across all 
regions, three other factors were statistically significant in four out of the five regions. These 
three factors were capital asset ratio (was statistically significant in SSA, EAP, EECA and LA), 
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money supply (was statistically significant in EAP, EECA, LA and SA) and GDP growth (was 
statistically significant in SSA, EAP, EECA and LA). Regarding credit risk (Chapter three), 
the factors that were statistically significant across all regions included lagged credit risk, loan 
growth and provision for loan impairment. Loan growth squared was statistically significant in 
SSA, EAP, LAC and SA but statistically insignificant in EECA. Given these findings in 
Chapters two and three, it was concluded that both micro-level and macro-institutional factors 
influences the performance of MFIs. However, the effects of different factors are heterogenous 
across different regions.  
Another important aspect in the area of microfinance is the role of mobile financial services, 
given that not many studies have examined this role. Chapter four examined the factors that 
explain differences in the usage of MFI credit in Kenya but paid particular attention to the 
effect of mobile financial services on the usage of MFI credit. The results showed that the 
probability that an individual used MFI credit was lower among those individuals that used M-
banking and M-credit. These results suggest that M-Money and M-credit, on one hand, and 
MFI credit, on the other hand, are substitutes. This finding is explained by the convenience in 
terms of lower transaction costs, fast speed and fewer distance barriers that are associated with 
M-Money and M-credit compared to MFI credit. The likelihood of using MFI credit is also 
lower among males and married persons. The focus of microcredit on women rather than on 
men has been attributed to the fact that women are more likely to be poor but better credit risks 
compared to men (D’espallier et al., 2011; Ledgerwood, 1999).  Conversely, income, 
education, household size and location in a rural cluster were associated with a higher 
propensity to use MFI credit. Given that the mission of MFIs is to provide loans to the poor, 
the positive and significant effect of income on access to MFI credit should be of concern. It 
may suggest that microfinance is serving the needs of the non-poor at the expense of the poor 
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who should be the main beneficiaries. Non-linearities were detected in the relationship between 
the probability of using MFI credit and age of the prospective borrower. 
The findings in this thesis have important implications for researchers, practitioners and 
regulators of MFIs in SSA. First, the confirmation of threshold effects in the relationship 
between loan growth and risk implies that modest loan growth was not a source of instability 
in the MFI sector. However, excessive loan growth was detrimental to the stability and 
financial health of MFIs. This implies that prudent management of credit risk in MFIs will 
require a deliberate effort on the part of MFIs to determine the threshold beyond which loan 
growth becomes detrimental to their stability. Second, dynamics have been shown to predict 
lending growth and credit risk. This implies that lending methodologies (credit scoring, credit 
modelling) that incorporate past lending and loan defaults are likely to perform better. Third, 
the predictors of credit risk and loan growth in SSA are not necessarily the same in other 
regions. This implies that the regions are heterogenous and any policy interventions directed at 
managing loan growth and credit risk in MFIs should necessarily be heterogenous. In other 
words, the “one-size-fits-all” type of interventions may not work in microfinance. Fourth, the 
fact that both MFI-level, macroeconomic and institutional factors were found to significantly 
determine the levels of credit risk and loan growth implies that policies that promote MFIs 
should be necessarily complemented by favourable macroeconomic policies and a conducive 
regulatory and political environment. Fifth, the finding that income is positively associated 
with the usage of MFI credit implies that the non-poor are “crowding-out” the poor from 
microfinance markets. In terms of policy, MFIs should improve their client targeting process 
in order to focus their lending towards the poor. In part, they should target sectors with heavy 
concentrations of the poor and apply credit scoring approaches that recognize the 
characteristics of poorer clients. Lastly, the substitutability between M-banking and M-credit 
on one hand, and MFI credit, on the other hand, suggests that there is need to enhance the role 
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of M-credit in the MFI sector via building partnerships with developers of M-credit apps. The 
developers of the apps could then develop systems that integrate the features of MFI credit into 
their apps. 
In terms of research limitations, there were many outliers in the Mixmarket datasets that were 
used in Chapters two and three of this thesis although log-transformations were combined with 
instrumental variable estimators to minimize the impact of such outliers on the regression 
estimates. The presence of outliers was evident from huge disparities between the means and 
medians. In addition, the two chapters attempted to examine trade-offs between loan growth 
and credit risk using system GMM estimators based on mean regressions. However, mean 
regressions are limited in identifying trade-offs at different points in the conditional distribution 
of loan growth and credit risk. Further research in this area should explore the possibility of 
using quantile regression approach, which is based on median regression and is able to examine 
the impact of loan growth on credit risk (and vice versa) on both the location and the scale of 
parameters of the model. A quantile regression has the extra merit of being able to permit a 
richer understanding of the data and minimizes the impact of outliers on the regression results. 
In Chapter 4, cross-sectional data for 2013 and 2015 were used since the two data sets could 
not be conveniently merged. Future research using FinAccess datasets in Kenya should explore 
the possibility of applying panel data sets. One of the main advantages of panel datasets is the 
feasibility of analysing dynamics as well as being able to control for individual heterogeneity 
and time-effects.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure A1: Gross loan portfolio - growth and variability 
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Figure A2: Credit risk and it's variability 
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Figure A3: Global distribution of credit risk (2000-2014)  
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Table A1: Selected indicators of microfinance outreach 
   Median annual growth (%) 
 2000 2014 2000-2014 2000-2007 2007-2014 
Gross loan portfolio  
Central Africa - 537 25.5 39.9 19.0 
Eastern Africa 6.03 3150 28.2 38.2 19.5 
Southern Africa 152 321 27.2 38.3 14.7 
Western Africa 42.4 1860 23.3 34.5 15.5 
Total 255 5870 25.0 36.8 16.7 
Assets  
Central Africa - 1020 26.2 40.8 18.9 
Eastern Africa 129 5520 29.2 38.5 18.5 
Southern Africa 178 470 28.5 35.2 19.8 
Western Africa 5690 2910 21.1 38.4 12.4 
All 364 9910 25.0 38.2 14.9 
Number of active borrowers 
Central Africa - 179798 18.8 29.2 11.1 
Eastern Africa 409088 873,241 20.8 28.5 12.9 
Southern Africa 36646 354,717 16.6 21.4 12.9 
Western Africa 408958 2,919,658 17.3 19.4 16.2 
All 854,692 4327414 18.0 24.5 14.4 
Number of depositors 
Central Africa - 784608 20.0 25.1 15.6 
Eastern Africa 456101 4916107 25.5 31.1 19.9 
Southern Africa 11865 1906107 25.4 37.7 18.4 
Western Africa 304680 7175222 20.8 21.1 20.3 
All 772646 14800000 22.7 25.2 15.5 
Source: Own computations using (www.mixmarket.org) database. Gross loan portfolio and assets are measured 
in US$ millions 
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Table A2: A comparison of selected MFI indicators in SSA and Non-SSA (2000 – 2014) 
 All SSA Non-SSA  
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean t-ratio 
Institutional characteristics 
Offices 10610 44 1922 27 8688 47 4.25*** 
Loan officers 10943 206 2084 116 8859 227 4.41*** 
Outreach indicators 
Number of active borrowers (‘000) 15062 63 3139 23 11923 73 6.77*** 
Percent of women borrowers 12245 0.65 2402 0.60 9843 0.66 10.3*** 
Gross loan portfolio USD millions 16313 41.1 3676 31.5 12637 43.9 2.06** 
Overall financial performance  
Operational self-sustainability 14745 1.17 3125 1.06 11620 1.20 5.77*** 
Revenues 
Financial revenue ratio 12326 0.27 2374 0.26 9952 0.27 2.19** 
Yield on gross loan portfolio 10017 0.25 1621 0.28 8396 0.24 -6.42*** 
Expenses 
Total expense ratio 12338 0.26 2363 0.29 9975 0.26 -5.50*** 
Financial expense ratio 9715 0.10 1591 0.11 8124 0.10 -0.767 
Loan loss provision expense ratio 11826 0.09 2127 0.31 9699 0.04 -2.62*** 
Administrative expense ratio 9874 0.08 1623 0.12 8251 0.08 -14.9*** 
Efficiency 
Operating expense/loan portfolio 12332 0.31 2329 0.47 10003 0.27 -14.6*** 
Personnel expense/loan portfolio 9744 0.15 1564 0.19 8180 0.14 -6.43*** 
Productivity 
Borrowers per staff member 10658 313 1947 346 8711 305 -3.69*** 
Depositors/staff member 12279 131 2599 244 9680 100 -19.3*** 
Risk and liquidity 
Write off rate 10950 0.03 1824 0.05 9126 0.02 -3.51*** 
Non-earning liquid assets/ total assets 11277 0.17 2071 0.23 9206 0.15 -22.8*** 
***significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level 
Source: Own computations using (www.mixmarket.org) database 
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Table A3: Sample countries 
SSA South Asia MENA LAC EECA ECA 
Angola 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
DRC 
Congo 
Cote d'Ivoire  
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
India 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Morocco 
Palestine 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
Yemen 
Argentina 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Albania                         
Armenia                      
Azerbaijan 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina                        
Bulgaria                         
Croatia                         
Georgia                         
Hungary                      
Kazakhstan                          
Kosovo                
Kyrgyzstan                       
Macedonia                         
Moldova                        
Mongolia                      
Montenegro                          
Poland                         
Romania                          
Russia                          
Serbia                        
Slovakia                      
Tajikistan                          
Turkey                         
Ukraine                      
Uzbekistan 
Cambodia 
China                      
East Timor                            
Fiji                       
Indonesia                            
Laos                         
Malaysia                 
Myanmar 
(Burma)                
Papua
New 
Guinea                     
Philippines                           
Samoa                 
Solomon 
Islands                        
Thailand                           
Tonga                         
Vanuatu                         
Vietnam 
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Table A4: Cross-country specific variables (averages for 2004 – 2014)  
 Loan growth 
(ratio) 
Credit risk 
(Ratio) 
Capital asset 
ratio 
Return on 
equity 
HHI-
Index 
Angola 0.383 0.066 0.427 0.185 0.109 
Benin 0.203 0.125 0.149 0.785 0.022 
Burkina Faso 0.261 0.074 0.225 0.065 0.080 
Burundi 0.244 0.115 0.360 -0.193 0.057 
Cameroon 0.239 0.173 0.227 -0.006 0.040 
CAR 0.111 0.381 0.042 1.152 0.136 
Chad 0.176 0.095 0.375 0.028 0.089 
Comoros -0.016 0.108 0.187 0.096 0.275 
DRC 0.521 0.103 0.389 0.143 0.078 
Congo 0.193 0.116 0.270 -0.019 0.293 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.275 0.175 -0.211 0.812 0.078 
Ethiopia 0.307 0.072 0.441 0.085 0.036 
Gabon 0.522 0.172 0.735 -0.436 0.530 
Gambia 0.510 0.180 0.299 -0.386 0.105 
Ghana 0.272 0.105 0.268 0.1745 0.117 
Guinea 0.399 0.093 0.288 0.078 0.056 
Guinea-Bissau 0.873 1.148 0.090 -2.017 0.268 
Kenya 0.363 0.104 0.357 -0.362 0.062 
Liberia 0.208 0.190 0.559 -0.209 0.257 
Madagascar 0.264 0.114 0.357 -0.121 0.020 
Malawi 0.321 0.097 0.503 -0.372 0.084 
Mali 0.272 0.089 0.279 0.100 0.021 
Mozambique 0.236 0.075 0.519 -0.057 0.046 
Namibia 0.491 0.023 0.325 -1.718 0.249 
Niger 0.111 0.124 0.392 -0.074 0.055 
Nigeria 0.352 0.141 0.419 0.238 0.033 
Rwanda 0.277 0.269 0.446 -0.068 0.197 
Senegal 0.149 0.093 0.160 -0.045 0.031 
Sierra Leone 0.378 0.085 0.542 -0.097 0.053 
South Africa 0.253 0.226 0.488 -0.350 0.188 
South Sudan 0.286 0.213 0.265 0.227 0.272 
Swaziland 0.164 0.112 0.398 0.048 0.111 
Tanzania 0.268 0.080 0.330 0.017 0.116 
Togo 0.201 0.171 0.117 -0.109 0.056 
Uganda 0.314 0.098 0.345 0.108 0.060 
Zambia 0.316 0.184 0.578 -0.388 0.042 
Zimbabwe -0.216 0.267 0.373 0.370 0.115 
SSA 0.280 0.124 0.308 0.035 0.076 
Note: DRC is Democratic Republic of Congo. Non-SSA refers to the following country groupings – East 
Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and South Asia (SA).  Loan growth refers to growth in loan 
portfolio. 
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Table A5: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Loan growth (ratio) 0.29 0.23 0.52 -2.54 5.31 2.63 26.27 
Credit risk (ratio) 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.00 2.08 4.98 45.16 
HHI (index) 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.27 2.53 11.37 
Capital asset ratio  0.32 0.26 0.26 -1.53 1.00 -0.07 6.45 
Return on equity -0.09 0.04 1.79 -45.54 8.88 -19.96 500.15 
Money supply (%)  28.48 24.70 10.74 7.20 80.80 1.56 7.33 
GDP growth (%) 2.58 2.00 2.98 -7.00 18.00 0.67 7.08 
Inflation (%) 7.79 6.80 15.69 -35.80 302.10 15.86 298.67 
Reg. quality (index) -0.50 -0.43 0.34 -2.21 0.68 -0.44 4.67 
Ease of getting credit (Index) 33.08 18.75 17.62 12.50 87.50 0.75 2.61 
 
Table A6: Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
(1) Loan growth (ratio) 1          
(2) Credit risk (ratio) -0.256*** 1         
(3) HHI (index) -0.0203 0.129*** 1        
(4) Capital asset ratio 0.0802* -0.174*** 0.0628 1       
(5) Return on equity 0.0463 -0.144*** -0.0428 0.0509 1      
(6) Money supply (%) -0.0497 0.0443 0.234*** -0.0758* -0.0313 1     
(7) GDP growth (%) 0.100** -0.0733* 0.0412 0.0996** 0.0756* -0.171*** 1    
(8) Inflation (%) -0.189*** 0.119*** 0.0991** 0.0673 -0.0334 0.0327 -0.126*** 1   
(9) Regulatory quality (index) 0.0625 -0.105** 0.0672 -0.00912 -0.0245 0.374*** 0.0916** -0.236*** 1  
(10) Ease of getting credit (index) 0.0116 0.0420 0.418*** 0.0532 -0.0594 0.308*** 0.145*** 0.183*** 0.363*** 1 
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Table A7: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean S.D. Min Max Skew Kurt 
Credit risk 0.12 0.15 0.00 2.08 4.99 45.24 
Loan growth 0.29 0.52 -2.54 5.31 2.78 27.04 
Loan growth sq.  0.35 1.54 0.00 28.23 12.87 206.14 
Prov. for loan 
impairment  
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
 
-0.15 
 
0.36 
 
3.54 
 
29.48 
Capital asset ratio 0.32 0.26 -1.53 1.00 -0.07 6.44 
Return on equity -0.09 1.80 -45.54 8.88 -19.91 497.24 
Private credit  17.48 10.52 2.00 78.30 2.57 13.67 
GDP per capita 
growth 
 
2.59 
 
2.99 
 
-7.00 
 
18.00 
 
0.66 
 
7.05 
Inflation 7.79 15.73 -35.80 302.10 15.82 297.32 
Political stability -0.54 0.73 -2.37 1.18 -0.59 2.49 
Ease of getting credit 33.11 17.64 12.50 87.50 0.75 2.60 
 
Table A8: Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Loan growth 1          
2. Loan growth squared 0.672*** 1         
3. Prov. for loan impairment -0.0473 0.0147 1        
4. Capital asset ratio 0.0804** 0.0277 0.0513 1       
5. Return on equity -0.0129 -0.0212 -0.0263 -0.0227 1      
6. Private credit -0.0144 -0.0328 0.0725* -0.0215 -0.0208 1     
7. GDP per capita growth 0.110*** -0.00908 -0.00226 0.118*** 0.0316 -0.095** 1    
8. Inflation -0.163*** 0.101** 0.0884** 0.0671* -0.0213 -0.0773* -0.113*** 1   
9. Political stability -0.0736* -0.0129 -0.0204 0.0530 0.0266 0.119*** 0.0746* -0.164*** 1  
10. Ease of getting credit 0.0407 0.00700 0.180*** 0.0912** -0.0538 0.486*** 0.123*** 0.176*** -0.230*** 1 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A9: Credit risk determinants in SSA, alternative specifications 
 The dependent variable is credit risk (in logs) 
 RE FE OLS 
Credit risk (L1) 0.29*** 0.11** 0.40*** 
 (0.054) (0.043) (0.033) 
Loan growth -0.89*** -0.89*** -0.83*** 
 (0.168) (0.207) (0.185) 
Loan growth squared 0.46*** 0.37** 0.45*** 
 (0.115) (0.159) (0.144) 
Provision for loan impairment 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.029) 
Capital asset ratio 0.05 0.06 0.01 
 (0.178) (0.369) (0.139) 
Return on equity -0.00 0.12* -0.05 
 (0.058) (0.072) (0.058) 
Private credit  0.00 0.03*** 0.00 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) 
GDP per capita growth -0.01 -0.00 -0.02* 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) 
Inflation -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Political stability -0.01 -0.01 -0.02* 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) 
Ease of getting credit 0.56*** 0.63*** 0.51** 
 (0.149) (0.225) (0.239) 
Constant -1.02*** -1.74*** -0.50* 
 (0.244) (0.383) (0.280) 
No of observations 394 394 394 
R-squared 0.45 0.31 0.47 
Wald chi2 218 4.21 13.43 
The choice between random effects and fixed effects model is determined by the Hausman 
test. Results for this test yield a Chi2 (24)=67.94, prob=0.000. On this basis, the null 
hypothesis that random effects provide consistent estimates is strongly rejected.  
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Table A10: Summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions 
 2015 (N=8665) 2013 (N=6449) 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Median Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.  Median Minimum Maximum 
MFI loan 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 
M-money 0.69 0.46 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.62 0.48 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Income  16,092 181,685 6,000 0.00 15,150,000 7,228 17,526 3,000 0.00 450,000 
Age 37.20 16.57 33.00 16.00 100.00 36.54 15.53 32.00 16.00 97.00 
Male 0.39 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Married 0.60 0.49 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.48 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Educated 0.82 0.38 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.85 0.36 1.00 0.00 1.00 
HH size 4.39 2.49 4.00 1.00 20.00 4.46 2.54 4.00 1.00 24.00 
Rural 0.56 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
M-banking 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00 - - - - - 
M-credit 0.10 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 - - - - - 
Poor 0.41 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table A11: Correlation matrix (2015, N=8665) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1) MFI loan 1           
2) M-money 0.197*** 1          
3) M-banking 0.154*** 0.291*** 1         
4) M-credit 0.145*** 0.208*** 0.670*** 1        
5) Income 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.020 0.018 1       
6) Age 0.112*** -0.059*** -0.139*** -0.091*** 0.017 1      
7) Male 0.048*** 0.078*** 0.121*** 0.098*** 0.031** 0.039*** 1     
8) Married 0.104*** 0.097*** 0.003 0.005 0.027* 0.088*** -0.0141 1    
9) Education 0.135*** 0.368*** 0.213*** 0.151*** 0.022* -0.312*** 0.115*** -0.0179 1   
10) HH size -0.035** -0.136*** -0.106*** -0.075*** -0.025* -0.114*** -0.0787*** 0.195*** -0.109*** 1  
11) Rural -0.042*** -0.187*** -0.211*** -0.157*** -0.038*** 0.149*** -0.0161 0.0657*** -0.191*** 0.203*** 1 
 
Table A12: Correlation matrix (2013, N=6112) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1) M-money 1        
2) Income 0.159*** 1       
3) Age -0.067*** -0.009 1      
4) Male  0.038** 0.100*** 0.087*** 1     
5) Married 0.115*** 0.076*** 0.031* 0.026* 1    
6) Education 0.344*** 0.108*** -0.283*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 1   
7) HH size -0.058*** -0.025* -0.041** -0.079*** 0.202*** 0.017 1  
8) Rural 0.175*** 0.150*** -0.131*** -0.003 -0.077*** 0.166*** -0.212*** 1 
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Table A13: IV 2SLS estimates of the probability of using MFI credit by poverty status (2016) 
 Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if ever used MFI loan, 0 otherwise 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 
M-money -0.02 -0.10***     
 (0.022) (0.027)     
M-banking   0.04 -0.07***   
   (0.031) (0.024)   
M-Credit     0.07 -0.05** 
     (0.049) (0.026) 
Income  0.18*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.26*** 
 (0.051) (0.033) (0.043) (0.034) (0.042) (0.033) 
Age -1.25** -2.32*** -1.19** -2.62*** -1.21*** -2.63*** 
 (0.490) (0.481) (0.474) (0.538) (0.468) (0.538) 
Age squared 0.18*** 0.34*** 0.17*** 0.38*** 0.18*** 0.38*** 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) (0.073) (0.065) (0.074) 
Male -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.10*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Married -0.05*** -0.03* -0.04*** -0.03* -0.05*** -0.03* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Education 0.01 0.07*** 0.01 0.05* 0.01 0.05* 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016) (0.027) 
HH Size 0.02** 0.05*** 0.02** 0.05*** 0.02** 0.05*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
Rural 0.02 0.05*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.02 0.05*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
No of obs. 3,473 5,056 3,473 5,056 3,473 5,056 
Wald Chi2 123.4 527.6 129.6 533.0 128.1 541.2 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exogeneity test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is usage of microcredit dummy. IV refers to instrumental variable. Robust standard errors 
are reported (in parentheses). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  All regressions include a constant county dummies but these are not reported. Exogeneity test for 
IV 2SLS is the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test as described in Cameron and Trivedi (2010). The p-values for the DWH 
test are reported. 
 
